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Abstract 
 
In recent years, clinical disorders, including paranoia have been conceptualised as 
dimensional rather than categorical (Caspi et al., 2013; Ellett et al., 2013). The term 
‘paranoia’ itself has moved into the lexicon of everyday language. Despite this shift, 
no empirically derived, comprehensive lay definition exists. Two studies are 
presented that sought to investigate lay conceptions of paranoia in order to develop 
and validate a prototype of the construct and thereby understand how individuals 
themselves define and conceptualise paranoia. 
 
Study 1 presents a two-part study, aiming to address the question around whether lay 
views of paranoia have a prototype structure, characterised by a core set of central and 
peripheral features. Study 1 found evidence that the concept meets criteria for 
prototypic organisation. The prototype uncovered a view of paranoia that in many 
ways mirrored that of psychiatric and theoretical conceptions. 
 
The second part (Study 2) presents the first steps involved in testing and validating 
the prototype and was specifically aimed at addressing the question of whether the 
paranoia prototype is used to guide information processing. Study 2 found, consistent 
with prediction, that centrality of features affected cognition (Hepper, Ritcher, 
Sedikides & Wildschut, 2011; Kearns & Fincham, 2004). The prototype was activated 
to a greater extent when participants encountered a word or phrase that was central to 
the construct of paranoia.  
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Results from this series of studies provide initial support for the idea that people have 
and use a prototype for paranoia. The prototype is supportive of dimensional views of 
paranoia. Despite the need for further validation, the prototype provides an important 
step in promoting lay views. In addition to this it acknowledges similarities and 
differences between lay conceptualisations, theoretical and professional perspectives. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of theoretical, clinical and research 
implications of the findings.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview of Introduction Chapter  
In recent years, clinical disorders, including paranoia have been conceptualised as 
dimensional rather than categorical (Caspi et al., 2013; Ellett et al., 2013). There is 
now a proposed continuum of paranoia, which suggests milder forms are commonly 
experienced within nonclinical populations (Bebbington et al., 2013; Ellett, Lopes & 
Chadwick, 2003; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Freeman, 2008; Freeman et al., 2011), 
with persecutory delusions being the clinical manifestations at the extreme end of the 
continuum (Strauss, 1969). Such findings have begun to free paranoia from its 
associations with severe mental illness and paranoia is now viewed as a phenomenon 
to be explained in its own right (Ellet et al., 2003; Ellett et al., 2013; Ellet & 
Chadwick, 2007; Freeman, 2007). The term ‘paranoia’ itself has moved into the 
lexicon of everyday language. Despite theoretical (Freeman & Garety, 2000) and 
psychiatric definitions (e.g. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Disorders, 5th ed.,; 
DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) acknowledging this shift, at present 
no empirically derived and comprehensive lay definition exists. Given paranoia’s 
widespread cultural and societal significance there is now a need to improve 
definitional coverage of the construct. This will improve our understanding of how 
individuals themselves define and conceptualise it and the nature and mechanisms by 
which paranoia operates. In particular, the current thesis proposes that laypersons’ 
views of paranoia will have a prototype structure characterised by a core set of central 
features. By understanding this, it is hoped that important new knowledge will be 
generated about the phenomenon of paranoia. Based on this, the current project aims 
to provide new directions and methods for studying paranoia. This chapter begins by 
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exploring conceptions of paranoia to date. It will then move on to present the rationale 
as to why it is important to understand lay conceptions of paranoia, whilst reviewing 
what we already know about such conceptions. Considerations around definitional 
approaches are given and an overview and critical appraisal of prototype theory for 
paranoia is made. The chapter will conclude by outlining the study and proposed 
research questions. 
1.2 Conceptions of Paranoia 
Historical conceptions. 
The term “paranoia” originates in the early 19th century, and is modern Latin, derived 
from the Greek paranoos ‘distracted’, from para ‘irregular’ and noos ‘mind’ (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2015). Early psychoanalytic theories viewed paranoia as a 
psychological disorder, serving a defensive function and definitions focused largely 
on the diagnostic aspects of the disease. For example, Freud and Breuer (1895) 
suggested that sexual disturbances might play a significant role in the aetiology of 
paranoid delusions. More specifically, Freud (1896) postulated that projection was the 
primary defense mechanism in paranoia and that unconscious homosexual conflict lay 
at the root of most cases of paranoia. Conceptions of paranoia were, for the most part, 
dominated by descriptions of symptomatology.  
Psychiatric perspectives.  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, early psychiatric perspectives, 
similarly to Freud (1896), assumed that paranoia was some kind of disorder located 
within the individual, perhaps indicating a biological cause (Schifferdecker & Peters, 
1995). This mirrored a whole range of concepts and practices at the time, which were 
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being defined and calibrated within a political climate in which the idea of ‘suspicion’ 
was emerging (Foucault, 1979; Henriques et al., 1984; Rose, 1989). The emerging 
discipline of psychiatry was able to step into the breach and contributed to the 
construction of madness, developing ways of thinking about normality and 
abnormality (Foucault, 1980). New means of dealing with ‘madness’ and regulating 
the population were being found (Miller, 1986). Therefore, the emergence of 
suspicion as a psychiatric concept through the demarcation of ‘paranoia’ occurred not 
just through the professional aspirations of medicine but also alongside the political 
and historical necessities of the time (Harper, 1999). In particular, the assertion of 
paranoia as an individual pathology conveyed the importance of trust, rationality, 
reasonableness and optimism as qualities of the new concept of the ‘self’ (Rose, 
1989). This allowed for the expansion of literature around diagnosing psychiatric 
disorders including schizophrenia. Such classificatory systems implied the notion of 
paranoia as a pure pathology, a single disease (e.g. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Disorders; 3rd ed.; DSM-III; APA, 1980; 3rd ed., rev.; DSM-IIIR; APA, 1987).  
 
During the last century, psychiatric perspectives have continued to see paranoia as a 
discrete symptom, a sign of severe mental illness, and relied upon a Kraepelinian 
dichotomous approach (Esterberg & Compton, 2009). This perspective significantly 
influenced the conceptualisation of psychiatric disorders. This included psychosis, as 
evidenced by systems of classification (e.g. DSM-IV; APA, 1994), which have 
determined the presence of psychiatric disorders by applying certain operationalised 
criteria (Johns & van Os, 2001). These diagnostic manuals conceptualised paranoia as 
“a pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are 
interpreted as malevolent” (4th ed.; DSM-IV; APA, 1994). The concept of paranoia 
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has frequently been associated with schizophrenia, delusional disorder and paranoid 
personality disorder, but has also been related to diagnoses such as depression and 
anxiety (APA, 1994). 
 
This dichotomous or categorical approach has been the dominant approach to 
paranoid delusions for many years (Jones et al., 2003), with Jaspers (1963) arguing 
that delusions, and the mechanisms that form and maintain them, are distinct from 
normal beliefs. However, such conceptualisations and diagnostic criteria for paranoia 
have been widely criticised for: (1) conceptual incoherence and susceptibility to 
significant counter examples, and (2) prioritising form over content (Bell, Halligan & 
Ellis, 2006; David, 1999; Leeser & O’Donohue, 1999; Spitzer, 1990) which de-
contextualises individual experiences. These approaches favoured clinicians’ beliefs 
and fostered pathologisation (Boyle, 1992), in that society was assumed to be rational 
and homogeneous when compared to the paranoid individual (Harper, 1999). 
However, in recent years such positions have become a contradictory view to 
evidence that demonstrates widespread prevalence of supposedly ‘abnormal beliefs’ 
within the general population (e.g. Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; Freeman et al., 
2011). Such findings have now begun to be recognised and represented within the 
latest diagnostic manual, the DSM-V (5th ed.; DSM-5; APA, 2013). 
 
Persecutory delusions within the DSM-V (Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other 
Psychotic Disorders) are described as the following:  
 
“Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting 
evidence. Their content may include a variety of themes (e.g. persecutory, referential, 
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somatic, religious, grandiose)[…] Delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly 
implausible and not understandable to same-culture peers and do not derive from 
ordinary life experiences […] The distinction between a delusion and a strongly held 
idea is sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on the degree of conviction 
with which the belief is held despite clear or reasonable contradictory evidence 
regarding its veracity” (5th ed.; DSM-5; APA, 2013). 
  
Although differences initially do not seem very significant, there are some notable 
shifts. First, as many psychologists have commented, delusions need not be false 
(Coltheart, 2007), and being false is no longer a necessary condition for a belief to be 
delusional in the DSM-V description. Second, delusions do not need to be about 
external reality or to be based on incorrect inference. They could be about oneself and 
one’s own experiences, requiring little or no inference. Third, we may have no proof 
against the truth of a belief, even when the belief is wildly implausible, and this is 
reflected in the move from the phrase; “despite what constitutes incontrovertible and 
obvious proof or evidence to the contrary” (4th ed.; DSM-4; APA, 1994), to the 
phrase, “despite clear or reasonable contradictory evidence regarding its veracity” 
(5th ed.; DSM-5; APA, 2013). Finally and perhaps most significantly, the new account 
narrows the gap between delusions and other irrational beliefs, suggesting that the 
epistemic features of delusions are not unique to pathologies of the mind, but 
characterise many of our everyday beliefs. This change within the DSM-V (APA, 
2013) introduced a radical shift in terms of dimensionality. Recognition of the notion 
of dimensions enabled clinicians to gauge severity of an individual’s condition by 
rating factors such as subjective distress and degree of impairment in addition to 
symptoms. However, it also allowed for disorders to be deconstructed into 
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components that could be addressed separately, such as the depression that 
accompanies many disorders. This approach acknowledged that ‘pure’ disorders are 
rare and comorbidity is the norm (Miller & Holden, 2010). This was a shift away 
from categorical classification of mental illness to an integrated categorical-
dimensional approach (Pomeroy & Parrish, 2012). Such changes demonstrated 
acknowledgement of a possible dimensional view that psychiatric symptoms are on a 
continuum with normal mental states (Allardyce, Suppes & van Os, 2007). Although 
not fully replacing categorical diagnoses, the DSM-V changes go some way in 
capturing the underlying dimensional structure of psychiatric disorders, including 
psychotic symptomatology, within the constraints of a categorical system (Heckers et 
al., 2013). 
Theoretical conceptions. 
As with early psychiatric positions, initial theoretical notions solely conceptualised 
paranoia within the context of severe mental illness or as having defensive functions. 
Even then, researchers were trying to explain a diagnosis such as schizophrenia rather 
than paranoia itself or its component parts. However, towards the end of the 20th 
century theoretical conceptions of paranoia started to evolve. There emerged a need to 
take note of individual variability and the multidimensionality of the experience of 
paranoia, to better understand each dimension of the delusional experience. In 
particular focus shifted toward the cause of the content of a delusion, the degree of 
belief conviction, resistance to change, level of implausibility and distress caused. 
Literature began to acknowledge the possibility that different factors were involved in 
different dimensions of paranoid experiences and that delusions represented points on 
a continuum, with normal functioning distanced from schizophrenia by these different 
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factors (Strauss, 1969). In 1988, Oltmann outlined his position, which suggested that 
assessing the presence of paranoia might best be accomplished by considering a list of 
characteristics of dimensions, none of which are necessary or sufficient, that with 
increasing endorsement produce greater agreement on the presence of a delusion.  
Between 1990-2000 this concept was expanded upon. Researchers adopted a single-
symptom approach to psychosis, isolating single elements of psychopathology for 
study. This approach facilitated greater theoretical understanding of important 
phenomena, such as delusional beliefs (e.g. Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; 
Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Trower & Chadwick, 1995) and provided greater argument 
to focus on the multi-dimensional nature of delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2000). As 
Spitzer (1992) stated, “there is more to say about delusions than that they are present 
or absent”. 
       
These changes in perspective highlighted a significant lack of clarity around the 
concept of paranoia, persecutory delusions and their definition (Garety, 1985; Harper, 
1992; Heise, 1988; Jones, 1999; Strauss, 1969). The implication of this for empirical 
research was that within the literature terms such as paranoia, persecutory beliefs and 
persecutory delusions were being used both interchangeably and to refer to different 
concepts (Freeman, 2008), leading to concerns around whether researchers were 
indeed studying the same phenomenon. Single-symptom research requires confidence 
that researchers are isolating the same elements of psychopathology and thus clear 
definitions of the phenomenon of interest are needed. Clarification around this issue 
specifically for persecutory delusions was offered by Freeman and Garety (2000), 
who outlined a set of robust criteria for delusions to be classified as persecutory. The 
full criteria are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1 
Freeman and Garety’s (2000) criteria for defining persecutory delusions 
 
Criteria A and B must be met: 
A. The individual believes that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her 
B. The individual believes that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm 
There are a number of points of clarification: 
I. Harm concerns any action that leads to the individual experiencing distress 
II. Harm only to friends or relatives does not count as a persecutory belief, unless the 
Persecutor also intends this to have a negative effect upon the individual 
III. The individual must believe that the persecutor at present or in the future will 
attempt to harm him or her  
IV. Delusions of reference do not count within the category of persecutory beliefs 
 
The main strength of these criteria were that they accommodated a view of paranoia 
as a common psychological process, rather than framing it within a diagnostic 
approach to mental illness; the presence of persecutory delusions did not necessarily 
signify mental illness. Despite not differentiating between clinical and nonclinical 
populations, thereby failing to capture possible distinctions between the two ends of 
the continuum, Freeman and Garety (2000) captured and accommodated a broad 
range of paranoid experiences, from mild to severe. Unlike early reductionist 
psychiatric criteria, this approach highlighted important dimensional aspects of 
delusional beliefs (e.g. conviction, preoccupation, distress). This was in keeping with 
the theoretical position that delusions exist on a continuum of normal human 
experiences (Strauss, 1969).  
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Furthermore, Freeman and Garety’s (2000) approach included a focus on the content 
of such beliefs, notably emphasising the role of harm and the persecutor’s intention to 
cause harm and did not require an external judgement regarding falsity or 
delusionality. These criteria also, importantly, provided assurance that researchers 
were indeed studying the same phenomenon, enabling both a focus on pure 
phenomena and comparisons across research studies. By improving the clarity and 
validity of theoretical and research developments, Freeman and Garety (2000) 
facilitated the study of paranoia in both clinical (Green et al., 2006; Freeman, Pugh, 
Vorontsova, Antley, Slater, 2010) and nonclinical (Ellett et al., 2003; Freeman et al., 
2008) populations. 
Categorical Versus Continuous Approaches to Paranoia. 
As described, the categorical, traditionally psychiatric, approach assumes a 
dichotomous view of psychosis and its core symptoms. This perspective considers 
qualitative differences between psychotic symptoms and their normal counterparts 
(Esterberg & Compton, 2009; Johns & van Os, 2001), arguing that delusions are 
distinct from normal beliefs (Jaspers, 1963). Such qualitative differences are seen to 
account for the observation that delusional beliefs are not formed on the basis of all 
relevant information, and are frequently unreceptive to counterargument (Jones et al., 
2003). Seeing paranoia as discontinuous means that it is not deemed to be part of 
normal healthy psychological functioning (Tai & Turkington, 2009).  
 
More recently however, paranoia has become a term that has moved into the lexicon 
of everyday language to describe ordinary feelings of mistrust and suspiciousness. 
This has paralleled an increasing evidence base and theoretical shifts supporting the 
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idea that paranoia lies on a continuum (Chapman & Chapman, 1980, Claridge, 1997; 
Johns, 2005; Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999; Roesler et al., 2007; Rossler et al., 2011; 
Van Os & Verdoux, 2003). This dimensional view posits that paranoid delusions may 
be found at the severe end with milder attenuated forms being present in the general 
population (Combs, Michael & Penn, 2006; Freeman, 2007; Versmissen et al., 2008). 
Moreover it supports delusions are not discrete, discontinuous entities but better 
considered as complex, multidimensional phenomena (Garety, Everitt & Hemsely, 
1988; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Kendler, Glazer & Morgenstern, 1983) that differ in 
quantitative ways from normal experiences (Johns & van Os, 2001). 
Distinctions within the dimensional view.  
Despite sharing the concept of a continuum between clinical and nonclinical 
symptoms of psychosis, perspectives differ significantly in their approaches to the 
idea of dimensionality (Costello, 1994) and there is some confusion as to the nature of 
the continuum under discussion. Researchers commentating on this topic do not often 
distinguish between the variability and severity of the phenomena themselves, within 
or between individuals, versus the distribution of symptoms or risk factors in a 
population. However, some attempts to distinguish between the different sets of views 
have been made. These are represented within the phenomenological and 
vulnerability view and the continuous and quasi-continuous view.  
 
The phenomenological and vulnerability distinction. 
The phenomenological view assumes that the psychotic characteristics found in non-
clinical populations are less intense, but not qualitatively different from those 
experienced by clinical populations (Costello, 1994). In contrast, the vulnerability 
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view proposes that the amount and severity of ‘psychosis like’ symptoms can signify 
vulnerability to the subsequent development of psychosis (Ellett, Allen-Crooks, 
Stevens, Wildschut & Chadwick, 2013). That is, it represents a person’s ‘psychosis 
proneness’ (Claridge, 1994; Mason, Claridge, & Williams, 1997).  
      
The continuous and quasi-continuous distinction. 
An additional distinction within the dimensional view is between continuous and 
quasi-continuous relationships between nonclinical symptoms of paranoid ideation 
and the clinical disorder of persecutory delusions. If the relationships between 
symptoms and disorder were truly linear this would create a smooth line of continuity, 
with severity and need for care increasing precisely in line with the level and 
frequency of symptoms (Johns & Van Os, 2001). The quasi continuous view, on the 
other hand, proposes that there is a normal distribution of psychotic symptoms; 
however at a certain point they become critical and an abrupt nonlinear increase in 
severity and need for care emerges. This quasi-continuous view is described as being 
the ‘disease based’ model (Claridge, 1994). This is favoured by psychiatry and fits 
with a medical model that views psychosis-like experiences as incomplete 
manifestations of psychosis. This differs from the fully continuous personality based 
perspective; in which psychotic-like traits are not just lesser signs of a disorder but 
actually exist within a ‘healthy’ personality. The majority of psychologists, accepting 
the dimensional approach to psychosis, support this perspective (Chapman, Chapman 
& Kwapil, 1995; Claridge, 1994; 1997; Claridge & Beech, 1995; Mason & Claridge, 
2006; Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995; Mason et al., 1997) and much of their work 
operates from within this theoretical framework. The underlying assumption is: “that 
ordinary individuals, in their everyday behaviour, manifest characteristics such as 
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self-centred thought, suspiciousness, assumptions of ill will or hostility, and even 
notions of conspiratorial intent that are reminiscent of paranoia” (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992).  
 Support for the Continuum approach. 
 Despite various approaches to the continuum view of paranoia, each of these 
perspectives stands to present a challenge to some of the suppositions of the 
categorical approach to paranoid delusions (Ellett et al., 2013). Indeed, research 
across several fields, including phenomenological and epidemiological studies, 
developmental psychopathology and cognitive psychology (Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005; Kaymaz & van Os, 2010; Linscott & van Os, 2010; 
van Os & Verdoux, 2003), present a convincing argument that paranoid beliefs are 
present within the general population and exist on a continuum within clinical to 
nonclinical populations (Bebbington et al., 2013; Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Ellet 
et al., 2003; Freeman et al., 2011; Strauss, 1969). 
  
Further support for the continuum approach comes from criticisms raised around the 
categorical classification. First, findings that nonclinical symptoms are associated 
with an increased likelihood of being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder (Eaton, 
Romanoski, Anthony, Nestadt, 1991; Van Os, Hanssen, Bijl, Ravelli, 2000) provide 
evidence consistent with the idea that clinical and non-clinical experiences are linked. 
In particular, Van Os et al. (2000) found that plausible symptoms, secondary 
symptoms, and non-clinically relevant symptoms were all very strongly associated 
with the presence of clinical symptoms. Similarly, Dominguez et al. (2011) found a 
dose-response relationship between persistent subclinical psychotic symptoms over a 
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three-year period and transition into psychosis five years later. Thus, whilst a 
proportion of individuals may experience paranoia that never reaches clinical 
intensity, it appears that for others, there is a continuum from mild to more severe 
experiences. Additionally, the high comorbidity of schizophrenia with other DSM-IV 
diagnoses (Fenton, 2001; Hanssen et al., 2003; Sirius, 1991) suggests the presence of 
common pathologies (Widinger & Samuel, 2005). 
 
Moreover, epidemiological studies have demonstrated shared commonality between 
risk factors for nonclinical symptoms and those in clinical disorders; for example, 
age, sex, urbanicity and cannabis use (van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul & 
Krabbendam, 2009). Other factors include family and social functioning (Olfson et 
al., 2002), living alone, and depression (Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os 
2003). With researchers presenting this as evidence of  ‘aetiological continuity’.  
 
Researchers in the Netherlands have also demonstrated single associated 
psychological variables, such as theory of mind and attributional style, across a 
hypothesized positive symptom continuum (Janssen et al., 2006; Vermissen et al., 
2008). Additionally, cognitive and affective variables that are implicated in formation 
and maintenance of paranoia in clinical samples appear to be implicated in the 
derivation of nonclinical paranoia. These factors include anxiety and worry (all 
concerning the theme of anticipation of threat) (Bebbington et al., 2013), self-esteem, 
depression, attributional biases and heightened public self-consciousness (Allen, 
Freeman, Johns & Maguire, 2006; Freeman et al., 2011). Also shown to be implicated 
in paranoia across the continuum are delusion-specific factors such as the conviction 
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of the belief, extent of preoccupation, and the intensity of the distress caused by the 
beliefs (Peters et al., 1999). 
 
Such literature, demonstrating the multidimensionality of delusions, also suggests that 
the content of paranoid beliefs is distributed along a continuum and that changes can 
occur within an individual over time (Ellett et al., 2003; Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, 
Vollebergh & Os, 2003; Poulton et al., 2000). Recent exploration of these issues by 
Bebbington et al. (2013), has demonstrated further support for a non-reflexive 
relationship. This tallies with the idea that paranoid ideation is continuously 
distributed, with actual paranoid delusions being placed at the extreme end of the 
continuum. At a single point in time, the continuum is defined by differences between 
individuals located at individual positions on the curve. However, people are 
themselves likely to vary in a way that would place them at different positions on the 
curve at different times, dependent on changing circumstances. In a sense, they would 
move along the curve, a speculation now that has some support from longitudinal 
investigation (Poulton et al., 2000). Despite delusions initially being defined as fixed, 
they are not unchangeable, which challenges perspectives that they are qualitatively 
different from normal beliefs (Appelbaum, Robbins & Vesselinov, 2004; Kuipers et 
al., 1997; Sharp et al., 1996). 
 
The most marked challenges to a dichotomous approach come from large bodies of 
evidence from prevalence studies, demonstrating high rates (of up to approximately 
25% depending on the definitional criteria used) of paranoid thinking within the 
general population (Eaton et al., 1991; Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 
2005; Gallup & Newport, 1991; Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson & Kessler, 1996; 
 24 
Lincoln, 2007; Peters et al., 1999; Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004; Tien, 1991; 
van Os et al., 2000). This high prevalence is perhaps unsurprising if paranoia arises 
from the normal everyday decision making about whether to trust or mistrust 
(Freeman et al., 2011). Taking this, and the volume of other evidence into 
consideration, the overall view seems to be that complete discontinuity between 
clinical and nonclinical experiences is unlikely. The symptom features of psychosis 
map so accurately on to the domain of nonclinical individual differences that the 
validity of the dimensional model of the disorder is no longer in doubt (Bebbington et 
al., 2013; Claridge, 1994; Freeman, 2007: Garety et al., 1988; Garety & Hemsley, 
1994; Kendler et al., 1983). This shift in support of a continuum view has also been 
reflected in more recent classification systems (e.g. DSM-V, APA 2013) that 
acknowledge psychosis symptoms are on a continuum with normal mental states 
(Allardyce, Suppes & van Os, 2007). 
 
Although the continuum hypothesis has gained substantial recognition and empirical 
support (van Os et al., 2009), it is important to be mindful that the broad notion of 
continuity is deceptively over-simplistic and substantial work is required to 
understand these ideas more fully (Lawrie, Hall, McIntosh, Owens & Johnstone, 
2010). There are still areas needing further clarification. Specifically, David (2010) 
proposes that there are questions around how phenomena are elicited in these studies, 
which impact upon the nature of what is obtained and how large the proportion of 
those experiencing the phenomena will turn out to be. For example, psychometric 
methods often used in psychology, especially composite ‘severity scales’ may 
inevitably lead to continua rather than remaining open to uncover potential categories 
(David, 2010). Hence, methodological issues can exert a large effect on whether one 
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is led to conclude that psychosis-like symptoms are common or rare in the population 
in question. 
       
In addition to this, the exact nature of a paranoia continuum still remains to be 
established. Important questions that persist include: what is the nature of the 
relationship between clinical and nonclinical paranoia (Claridge, 1994)? Are common 
psychological processes implicated in the emergence of paranoid cognitions in both 
populations? What prompts clinically meaningful transitions along the continuum 
(van Os et al., 2009)? And what prevents paranoid-like cognitions developing into 
clinical experiences of paranoia? Further investigation of the potential differences in 
content of clinical and nonclinical paranoid beliefs is also required (Freeman, Garety, 
& Kuipers, 2001), as well as examining differences between clinical and nonclinical 
groups, other than their levels of belief conviction, preoccupation, distress (Freeman 
et al., 2010), affective components (Freeman et al., 2011), or interpersonal sensitivity 
(Bebbington et al., 2013). 
 
Overall, the research to date is broadly supportive of the idea that paranoia exists in 
an attenuated form in the nonclinical population. An important implication is that 
nonclinical samples provide an accessible means of investigating paranoid-like 
experiences. This is important and demonstrates the potential of lay paranoia to 
further inform our understanding and treatment of paranoia in clinical samples. The 
evidence and reasoning around why it is important to better understand such 
conceptions of paranoia will now be elaborated on. 
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1.3 Why Is It Important to Understand Lay Conceptions of Paranoia? 
This section develops the rationale for exploring lay conceptions of paranoia, 
considering the prevalence of the term versus the current lack of understanding, flaws 
in current definitions, possible positive functions of paranoia not currently captured 
by definitions, disagreement about whether experiences of paranoia have to be false, 
and implications for the measurement of paranoia. 
Prevalence versus lack of empirical and theoretical understanding. 
There is a growing body of evidence that paranoia is widespread and that the concept 
firmly has a place in contemporary western culture. The prevalence of paranoia in 
everyday life (Ellett et al., 2003; Ellett et al., 2013; Freeman, 2008;) itself warrants 
further examination. With a move towards continuum views of psychiatric disorders, 
the importance of collaboration on the meaning of paranoia, including lay 
perspectives, has been emphasised. Although different manifestations of paranoia 
have been written about at length, there is an absence of psychological research that 
examines individuals’ conceptualisations of paranoia itself. This is an important gap 
in the paranoia literature because there are a number of ways in which lay conceptions 
of paranoia are likely to inform not only theory and research about paranoia, but also 
paranoia in therapeutic settings. As the concept of paranoia is receiving increasing 
scholarly attention across a number of different fields, it is now pertinent to obtain 
theoretical and empirical clarification.   
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Flaws in the current definition now that the term has moved into people’s 
everyday vernacular. 
Despite literature attempting to theoretically explain, understand and normalise 
paranoia (Freeman & Garety, 2000), empirical research on this important social 
phenomenon is yet to examine how individuals within the general population define 
and conceptualise paranoia. This is needed to reflect the construct’s broad societal and 
cultural significance. Although the term ‘paranoia’ has moved into the lexicon of 
everyday language the bulk of the literature characterises paranoia as part of a clinical 
disorder. The conceptualisation of paranoia as a disorder of a pathological individual 
ignores the vast social influence the concept of paranoia now has. Additionally, 
theoretical models, despite implying unique difference between nonclinical and 
clinical paranoia, do not always distinguish between the two. Thus, the occurrences of 
normal individuals engaging in ideational distortions are frequently described within 
the normal population as ‘paranoid’. The term has taken on meaning that is apparently 
independent of any indication of clinical disturbance, yet the content of the cultural 
lexicon of paranoia is not empirically defined.  
Possible positive functions not captured by current definitions. 
The focus on the destructive nature of paranoia has made it difficult to acknowledge 
how degrees of suspicion and mistrust may actually be adaptive and functional. Ellett 
et al. (2003) were the first to suggest that an evolutionary perspective may provide an 
explanatory framework, a theory that has now garnered considerable support 
(Bebbington et al., 2013; Kelleher, Jenner & Cannon, 2010; Preti & Cella, 2010). 
Ellett et al. (2003) proposed from an evolutionary perspective that paranoia is a trait 
that was selected and distributed in humans due to its adaptive value. This perspective 
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has been further supported by literature acknowledging that paranoia has valuable, 
appropriate characteristics in certain situations that can become excessive, just like 
anxious thoughts (Ellett & Chadwick, 2007). Without denying the fact that paranoia 
can be both dysfunctional and distressing, it is now suggested that there are several 
situations in which paranoia could be an adaptive trait. 
 
In evolutionary terms, it is useful to detect threats to self from potentially harmful 
others, using a ‘better safe than sorry’ conditional rule which could be critical for 
survival (Bebbington, 2002; Ellett et al., 2003; Freeman, 2007; Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Slater et al., 2005; Gilbert, Boxall, Cheung, & Irons, 2005). Whether to 
trust or mistrust is a judgement that lies at the heart of social interactions (Freeman, 
2007) and individuals who are trusting, open, and never suspicious of the intentions of 
others may end up as naïve objects of exploitation (Bebbington et al., 2013; Ellett et 
al., 2003). This type of suspicion is ubiquitous in everyday life and can help us to 
understand the actions of others by speculating on intentions or motives (Harper, 
1999). For example, suspicious accounts are common in forms of gossip (Emler, 
1992; Rosnow & Fine, 1976). In this respect, paranoia is an important cultural 
resource, which has a number of wide-ranging effects, for example, providing a 
location in which the subject can be positioned by others as ‘paranoid’ and in which 
the subject can position him or herself as knowing what is really going on (Smail, 
1993). Literature on this topic suggests that rather than bizarre or dysfunctional 
behaviours, conceptions of paranoia should in fact recognise the possibility of it being 
an understandable and even appropriate response to particularly toxic combinations of 
social trajectories and life events.  
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The possible positive functions of paranoia have been much more acknowledged 
outside of empirical psychology research, particularly within popular culture 
(Freedman, 1984; Parker, 1996; Sutin, 1995), where varying accounts of paranoia 
have contributed to the embeddedness of conspiratorial narratives within modern 
culture. There is a whole tradition of suspicious interpretation that does not 
necessarily attract pathologising of others. For example, novelists’ representations of 
the construct have fostered this notion and embodied the idea that in a time where we 
are saturated by information, ‘cultural paranoia’ becomes the means by which 
connections are forged and can be seen as the binding force of some communities 
(O’Donnell, 1992). O’Donnell (1992) writes: 
 
“What brings people together, as it were, is the sense that they are the wary 
participants in an unfolding historical plot over which they have no control, but 
through which they gain visible identity as historically unified 
subjects…paradoxically, she is empowered as one in a growing army capable of 
reading the signs of these plots and power relations not to resist or escape them but to 
formulate an ironic streetwise attitude toward them. One knows she is part of a series 
of orchestrated events over which she has no control, but knowing it confers a kind of 
legitimacy upon the knower” (p. 184).  
 
In fact it could also be argued that, as well as being useful and binding, suspicion is 
necessary within certain professions (e.g. the police force or security services) and 
movements. Political writers have demonstrated how conspiratorial stances have 
helped mobilise political groups (Billig, 1991; Hofstadter, 1966). This broad view 
sees paranoid discourse as one used not only by supposedly ‘abnormal’ or 
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pathological individuals but by all members of society. Yet within psychology 
literature the lack of lay conceptualisations and the existence of the psychiatric 
category of paranoia leads to the excluding and dividing practices of groups of 
individuals. This has meant that the potential positive functions of paranoia are not 
reflected or captured by current definitions. Therefore, it is perhaps overdue for 
research to examine whether the state of paranoia should continue to be characterised 
as predominately negative. Similarly, the nature of current definitions and lack of lay 
conceptions means paranoia is presented as a largely false experience.   
Disagreement in the literature around whether the experience has to be 
false. 
Traditional definitions of paranoia have viewed falsity as a key defining feature of the 
construct. Therefore, establishing a clinical definition of paranoia has been 
historically complicated by the need to determine a set of criteria with which to judge 
falsity (Freeman, 2008). However, as theories have developed, the focus has shifted to 
understanding the multi-dimensional aspects of paranoid experiences. This suggests 
that no single criteria signals delusionality (Freeman, 2007), but that delusions are 
complex experiences. 
 
Despite this change, theoretical disagreement exists on whether an experience has to 
be false in order for it to be defined as paranoia (as in the everyday phrase ‘just 
because you’re paranoid, doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you’). This presents a 
problem in operational accounts of paranoia, as it is difficult to reliably assess the 
accuracy of paranoid thoughts (Freeman, 2008). This is particularly challenging 
within nonclinical populations, as such judgements can seem easier in clinical cases 
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where the content is (sometimes) implausible; however this becomes much more 
difficult lower down the continuum (Freeman et al., 2010). Delusional beliefs can 
range from the obviously impossible to the more plausible. Therefore, the ability to 
reliably identify an unfounded persecutory belief is highly dependent on the content 
of that belief and as such is variable and often unclear (Ellett et al., 2013). Spitzer 
(1992) argues, that a delusion is not a delusion because it is a false statement but 
because it is a statement made in an inappropriate context and, most importantly with 
inappropriate justification. This proposes that the inappropriateness of an individual’s 
behaviour, rather than the inaccuracy of a belief, could be used to assess its delusional 
nature (Fennig, Fochtmann & Bromet, 2005). However, at present the literature does 
not provide a conclusive argument. Developing a lay definition would inform this 
debate given the heterogeneity and complexity of factors involved. Lay definitions 
would enable agreement on a common language, they may also allow us to describe 
and access the construct of these beliefs in question and enable ‘abnormal’ and 
‘delusional’ beliefs to be understood as arising not simply from damaged biological 
mechanisms or from information processing modules, but from cognitive beings 
firmly situated within their social setting (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006). Such an 
approach might also better allow us to treat service users with distressing beliefs, as 
well as provide clearer insight into how each of us comes to hold our own beliefs. 
Implications for the measurement of paranoia. 
Understanding lay conceptions of paranoia may also have important implications for 
the measurement of paranoia. Despite significant developments in the understanding 
of paranoia, many existing studies around nonclinical paranoia present with 
methodological drawbacks (Freeman et al., 2008), such as the inability of 
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questionnaire assessments of paranoia to rule out that paranoid thoughts are grounded 
in reality (Freeman, 2008), or interview methods to establish the truth of the claims 
underlying a suspicious thought. Discrepancies also exist between accounts of 
paranoia itself (Freeman & Garety, 2004) and have a tendency to ignore the multi-
dimensional nature of the experience (Freeman, 2007).  This means it is unclear what 
exactly is being measured – is it a phenomenon that is dimensional with clinical 
paranoia or is it a reasonable response to features of an experimental setting? Some of 
these limitations exist in part due to the lack of clarity and coherence around the 
definition itself. Either a universal definition that is able to accommodate such 
variance is required, or a set of related but distinguishable terms that punctuate 
meaningful points along the paranoia continuum. In the absence of the former, the 
latter has informally arisen. An informal classification system can be traced within the 
paranoia literature, in which terms such as paranoid or paranoid-like 
cognitions/thoughts/ideation are often used to refer to nonclinical experiences. 
However, these terms have not been defined and there is no consensus as to how they 
relate to, and are distinguishable from, one another (Freeman, 2007) or how 
individuals themselves interpret such constructs.  
 
As currently no obvious alternative successfully captures the mode of thought and 
perception that is often under investigation, paranoia is used despite its unintended 
clinical implications. Thus, research ends up using a term not necessarily truly 
representative of people’s experiences. Developing a lay definition of paranoia would 
be generative, by enabling investigators to study paranoia with an empirically 
informed representative definition. This would allow future research to clarify 
manipulation and measurement of paranoia, providing significant methodological 
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advantages. Understanding how people outside of the research community 
conceptualise and experience paranoia may also help researchers develop improved 
psychoeducational and therapeutic techniques. 
 
1.4 What Do We Already Know About Lay Conceptions Of Paranoia? 
The pervasiveness of paranoia has firmly been established over recent years. Once 
paranoia is conceived as on a continuum, its importance at both an individual and a 
societal level becomes increasingly apparent. The term paranoia has become part of 
people’s everyday vernacular. Research itself has also begun to free paranoia from its 
earlier associations, and view the concept as a phenomenon to be explained in its own 
right, linking it more specifically with suspicious thoughts apparent within the general 
population (Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Trower & Chadwick, 1995). This 
shift in research emphasis has been productive (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, 
Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001) and fits with theoretical models that have begun to 
treat paranoia as having different dimensions, rather than as a homogeneous 
diagnostic category (Chadwick, Birchwood & Trower, 1996; Chadwick & Lowe, 
1990). This has brought paranoia into the realm of normal human experience and 
begun to influence clinical practice. A normalising approach is now common in 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for Psychosis (CBT-P; Fowler, Garety, & Kuipers, 
1995; Kingdon & Turkington, 1994; Sensky, Turkington, Kingdon, Scott, Scott, et al., 
2000) and has been shown in empirical trials to help individuals with psychosis (e.g., 
Kingdon & Turkington, 1991; Kingdon & Turkington, 1994). Despite paranoia being 
deemed as ‘a normal human experience’ a coherent and consistent approach to 
understanding lay conceptions of paranoia is still lacking. In support of this, database 
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searches through Psychinfo, Psycharticles, PubPsych, Google Scholar and Web of 
Science, using the search criteria ‘paranoia, paranoid cognitions, paranoid-like 
cognitions, persecutory delusions, lay paranoia, nonclinical paranoia’ have revealed 
no literature around the content of the cultural lexicon of paranoia. There has 
therefore been a need highlighted to explore the meaning of such experiences from an 
experiential perspective (May, Hartley & Knight, 2003).  
Societal conceptions of paranoia. 
Lay conceptualisations of paranoia, not as a psychiatric disorder; have been widely 
explored within the social sciences, philosophy and the arts. The work of writers, 
including crime and spy authors, has contributed to both conspiratorial and 
surveillance-aware narratives being embedded within modern culture (Parker, 1996; 
Sutin, 1995).  The concept of paranoia firmly has a place in contemporary western 
culture, with different manifestations of paranoia being written about at length. 
Discussion in the last ten years has particularly focused on increased feelings of 
paranoia within our societies (Freeman & Freeman, 2008) and different authors have 
evidenced a rise of so-called ‘cultural paranoia’ (O’Donnell, 1992). 
 
There are several technological and societal issues that point to a likely rise in a 
paranoia culture. These include an increase in our awareness of the ways in which 
populations are surveyed by police and law enforcement agencies (Harper, 2008); 
higher mortality rates (Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner & Prothrow-Stith, 1997); 
urbanisation; migration; social isolation; income inequalities; and the tendency of the 
media to highlight the sensational and frightening (Freeman & Freeman, 2008). All of 
these factors can raise levels of fear and anxiety, preparing ground for paranoia to 
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thrive. Decreased levels of trust have also been shown to be a likely indicator of the 
health of a society and have been shown to be a central component of both social 
cohesion and social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995).  Such studies extend the 
significance of paranoid thinking beyond the psychiatric domain and highlight how 
studying lay perspectives in these milder variants of paranoia, such as mistrust and 
suspicion, could shed light on societal issues, such as individual well being and social 
cohesion.   
 
Now that persecutory ideation is conceived as on a continuum, its importance at all 
levels becomes ostensible (Rose, 1989). It is becoming increasingly apparent that 
concepts like paranoia serve both as psychiatric and everyday explanatory categories. 
Investigation therefore needs to be inter-disciplinary and take into account different 
conceptualisations. Current conceptions however are inherently dualistic (Harper, 
2008), viewing paranoia solely at an individual level or, alternatively, solely at a 
societal level. Inevitably, either perspective in isolation is limited and it perhaps now 
makes more sense to see conceptions of paranoia as both a position and a narrative. 
Having a greater understanding of lay conceptions of paranoia could help bridge this 
dichotomy. 
Existing lay perspectives within clinical populations. 
Qualitative research has played an important role in elucidating lay perspectives of 
psychosis within clinical populations and there has recently been an increase in the 
number of such studies. Literature has begun to capture the psychosocial nature of 
clinical paranoia and gain an understanding of the service users’ reality through their 
use of language. The body of literature is qualitative and largely employs grounded 
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theory methods of analysis (e.g. Boyd & Gumley, 2007; Carrick, Mitchell, Powell, & 
Lloyd, 2004; Hirschfield, Smith, Trower, & Griffin, 2005; McNally & Goldberg, 
1997), as well as including some experiential accounts (Chadwick, 1993). McCarthy-
Jones et al. (2013) have attempted to draw together the findings of these studies by 
performing a meta-synthesis of inductive qualitative research into psychosis. Ninety-
seven articles were identified for systematic appraisal. Themes that emerged across 
the literature included core processes such as fear and vulnerability; a sense of loss 
(including loss of basic human needs such as sleep, physical and financial security, 
relationships, self-esteem, hope); identifying a need for help; rebuilding or re-forging; 
and ‘gifts’ from psychosis. Subthemes including confusion, uncertainty and, people’s 
sense of self-being under attack were identified. The literature also describes how 
these experiences lead to individuals engaging with their safety systems and how all 
of these factors interact to create a complex and dynamic experience of paranoia 
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013). Additionally, what arose from several of the studies 
was a view of paranoia as a mechanism of keeping oneself safe in dangerous 
situations (Boyd & Gumley, 2007), matching theoretical conceptions of paranoia 
being an adaptive trait (Ellett et al., 2003).       
 
By acknowledging service user perspectives such research has further demonstrated 
how the experience of clinical paranoia is much more than simply just delusions. 
Unlike early psychiatric approaches or symptom-based approaches in cognitive 
psychology (Bentall, 2013) these studies describe personal experiences relating to 
psychosis and clinical paranoia. Such literature facilitates a move in clinical theory 
and practice to a more person-based model (Chadwick et al., 1996). Despite the 
sample sizes being small, thereby making the findings less generalisable and harder to 
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make systematic comparisons from, these studies support a move towards 
understanding individuals within their own terms of reference and acknowledging 
their personal histories. As many of these studies employed grounded theory methods 
of qualitative analysis, some attempts have been made to construct theory from a 
service user or ‘lay’ perspective. However, the sole focus has been within clinical 
populations, with many studies focusing on the journey to recovery rather than the 
explicit experience of paranoia itself. Whilst these studies are informative, their 
findings do not necessarily directly translate to the general population. Furthermore, 
most research into paranoia has relied on predetermined testable hypotheses from 
existing researcher’s theories (Popper, 1969); there is now a need to construct theory 
from a lay perspective. 
Possible commonalities between lay and professional views. 
It is possible that there may be a great deal of commonality between lay, service user, 
societal and professional views, however, as has been shown with other concepts the 
relationship can be a dialectical and interactive one. For example, the dominant 
psychiatric discourse has been represented within lay views (Gleeson, 1991). The 
effects of each of these perspectives depend on the position of the discourse user and 
the power of a particular account. Harper (1999) describes how, “in western culture, 
paranoia, as a short-hand description of madness, serves as a way of marking out and 
‘cutting out’ those we consider to be off, whose behaviour can no longer be seen to be 
explicable to normal social rules”. However without exploration of lay perspectives, 
these explanations cannot be assumed, particularly as such narratives have the 
potential effect of marking someone out as different. Such discussion has highlighted 
the need for lay discourses to be examined in more detail.  
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Engaging in lay perspectives of paranoia would provide credibility to the view that 
there exists a multiplicity of valid explanations for such experiences, which 
encompass not only the medical but also a variety of other standpoints. The 
acknowledgement of lay perspectives of paranoia would enable a reclaiming of an 
individual’s identities within an experience, previously only defined by professional 
discourse. To date, a coherent and consistent approach to understanding lay 
conceptions of paranoia is lacking. In particular, researchers are yet to understand 
what people mean when they refer to ‘paranoia’ in everyday social situations (for 
example, using phrases such as ‘you’re just being paranoid’ or ‘don’t be paranoid’). It 
is now vital that researchers seek to understand how people themselves conceptualise 
and view paranoia, including its affective and cognitive components as well as its 
contextual elements, to uncover whether lay views correspond with experts’ 
constructions. The studies presented in this thesis focus on understanding lay 
conceptions of paranoia.  
1.5 What Can A Prototype Approach Add? 
Lay conceptions of paranoia have thus far eluded explicit definition. We propose that, 
despite the apparent complexity of paranoia, lay conceptions may be best represented 
in terms of a prototype. Prototype theory is a mode of graded categorisation, where 
some members of a category are more central than others (Rosch, 1975). 
Understanding lay conceptions of paranoia in this way has the potential to contribute 
to the advancement of paranoia in both research and therapeutic settings. 
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Prototype Theory. 
Clarifying the properties of a construct is a vital and often neglected step in the 
research process (Rozin, 2009). One robust way to develop a good lay definition of a 
psychological construct is through the use of prototype theory and methodology 
(Rosch, 1975). Rosch (1975) was the first to distinguish prototype theory within the 
field of Psycholinguistic research and the theory’s development brought existing 
theories, such as the classical view (Markman, 1989), into question. 
 
The classical view of defining concepts assumes category membership is an all or 
none phenomenon; any instance that meets the criteria is a member and all others are 
not (Kearns & Fincham, 2004). Since each member must possess the same set of 
attributes that is the criterion for category inclusion, all members of a category are 
assumed to be equally representative. For example, when we consider a square, it’s 
necessary and sufficient features include it being a closed flat figure, having four 
sides, all sides being equal in length and all interior angles being equal. Although 
initially the classical approach was well supported (Armstrong, Gleitman, & 
Gleitman, 1983; Harnad, 1987), considerable research reinforced growing scepticism 
over its plausibility as an adequate explanation of most concepts used in everyday 
speech (Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Fox, 2011; Medin, 1989; Mervis & Rosch, 1981).    
 
Rosch (1975) argued that many natural language concepts do not lend themselves to 
this classical definition, in terms of having a set of necessary or sufficient conditions. 
Instead she proposed that many natural language categories have an internal structure, 
meaning that some features of a category are more strongly associated (prototypical) 
with the concept than others. To demonstrate this, Rosch (1975) gives the example of 
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an animal being more likely to be categorised as a bird if it is similar to a prototypical 
bird (e.g. a Swallow) than if it is similar to a non-prototypical exemplar (e.g. a 
Penguin). The prototype approach differs from the classical approach in that it 
involves flagging central features rather than identifying critical features. This means 
that not all instances of a concept are expected to share all of the features of the 
prototype. Instead, prototype categories are typically made up of distributions of 
attributes and some instances of categories are considered more ‘typical’, or central, 
members of the category than others; this then appears to guide classification and 
recognition of instances (Rosch, 1973).  
 
Rosch (1975) defined a hierarchy of categories within prototype theory, which 
includes superordinate, basic and subordinate categories. Basic categories are the 
largest class of which we can form a fairly concrete image (e.g. a chair), subordinate 
categories are collections of basic categories (e.g. furniture, includes chairs) and 
subordinate categories represent divisions of basic classes (e.g. deck chair, stool). 
Rosch stated that the functional purpose of categories was “to provide maximum 
information with the least cognitive effort” (p. 27). Although all categories are fuzzy 
in nature, members of a language group maintain communication by rounding them 
off to their core, specifically to their most common prototypes. When it comes to the 
emotion domain, some emotions can be properly defined (e.g. happiness, sadness, 
fear, anger), whereas other natural language categories of emotion are more 
ambiguous. Borders between such categories are vague, rather than clear-cut; 
membership within a category is a matter of degree rather than all or none; and 
different categories tend to overlap one another rather than be mutually exclusive. 
Therefore, prototypical emotions shade into less prototypical emotions, which then 
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shade into non-emotions. There is no distinct boundary to be found (Russell, 1991). In 
line with the idea that membership in a category is determined by resemblance, which 
can be ambiguous, this approach better fits complex and often unclear concepts of 
human experiences. This is an approach that appears to fit well with the apparent 
heterogeneity of available descriptions of paranoia. 
 
Rosch (1975) proposed two criteria that must be met for a concept to be defined as 
prototypically organised. First, individuals must be able to identify the features of the 
concept and make meaningful judgements about the strength of the feature’s 
relationship with the concept. Second, the centrality of features should affect 
cognition with respect to that concept. That is to say that the prototype is activated (to 
a greater or lesser extent) when an individual encounters a word or phrase that (more 
or less) resembles the construct. The prototype is subsequently used to guide 
information processing (e.g., speed of processing, interpretation, use of category 
names in language and memory); (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1978; Russell & 
Fehr, 1989).  
The rigour versus coverage debate. 
When endeavouring to develop a good theoretical definition of a psychological 
phenomenon, a compromise is needed between rigour and coverage—between the 
exactitude of scientific constructs and the breadth of everyday concepts (Gregg, Hart, 
Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008). Lay definitions lack scientific rigour, as they are not 
based on empirical evidence, do not fit a theoretical framework, and are not easily 
operationalised. This is in comparison with scholarly definitions that lack coverage 
(Hepper, Ritcher, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2011), as they do not comprehensively 
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capture the construct or reflect the diversity of people’s experiences. As discussed, 
there are flaws in current definitions of paranoia offered by scientific scholars. 
Existing medical diagnostic criteria and theoretical definitions could be criticised for 
overly prioritising rigour over coverage (e.g. Freeman & Garety, 2000). In order to 
improve the definitional coverage of the construct investigation is needed into what 
people generally understand by the term paranoia. A prototype approach to clarifying 
paranoia can address many of these challenges. Possessing a clear picture of a 
construct’s prototype allows researchers to predict and understand how people 
respond in more or less prototypical situations. The prototype also includes the 
diverse range of more or less representative elements involved (Rosch, 1975). It 
therefore allows for a scientifically testable yet comprehensively rich understanding 
of lay views of a construct.   
Strengths of prototype approach. 
As discussed, one of the main competitors to prototype theory is the classical model 
of concepts. However despite centuries of effort, the classical approach has yet to 
yield commonly agreed upon definitions for human experiences, such as emotions 
(Russell, 1991). This is a perspective that has now been endorsed by much 
psychological research (Fehr & Russell, 1991; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Kearns & 
Fincham, 2004; Lambert, Graham, & Fincham, 2009; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Smith 
& Medin, 1981). Rosch’s developments proposed that concepts are not only 
inherently vague but vary from person to person and, for the same person, from one 
time or context to the next (Barsalou, 1987). Studies have shown that non-distinct 
boundaries and varying degrees of category resemblances better reflect the way that 
laypeople represent concepts such as emotions (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Shaver, 
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Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). Indeed, the prototype approach has given us 
much insight into characterising people’s complex beliefs about domains of persons 
and social situations (Cantor & Mischel, 1979); psychiatric classifications (Cantor, 
Smith, French, & Mezzich, 1980); personality dimensions (Cantor & Mischel, 1977); 
and emotions (Fehr, 1982; Fehr & Russell, 1984; Russell & Bullock, 1986), including 
emotional states such as forgiveness (Kearns & Fincham, 2004), love (Fehr, 1988) 
and gratitude (Morgan, Gulliford & Kristjansson, 2014). Within each of these studies 
a set of central and peripheral features of each emotion, based on lay conceptions, 
were identified. Additional merits of this approach include it being both systematic 
and flexible, as it is seen to be adaptable to social knowledge in a way that remains 
qualitatively faithful to the language and thoughts of lay individuals, whilst providing 
quantitative characterisations of categories (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). Prototype 
theory captures the complex, changing stimuli of people’s perspectives. The prototype 
theory has accounted for a variety of psychological phenomena and has helped in 
explaining why some definitions may be so hard to produce. However, prototype 
theory has also been the subject of some debate (Armstrong et al., 1983; Harnad, 
1987; Lysak, Rule, & Dobbs, 1989), which will be outlined.  
Challenges to the prototype approach. 
Specific criticisms of the prototype approach to the study of emotion concepts have 
been raised. It has been suggested that perhaps the theory cannot be as simplistic as 
Rosch initially proposed (Clore & Ortony, 1988; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989) and 
that there is often a lack of clarity about the precise definition of ‘prototype’. As 
Murphy (2002) highlights, “many statements about prototypes in the literature are 
somewhat vague, making it unclear exactly what the writer is referring to”(p. 45). At 
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times, proposed models of prototype theory are criticised for not being detailed 
enough about the prototypes themselves (Armstrong et al., 1983). This lack of 
specificity can mean that throughout the literature categories adopt an idiosyncratic 
range of critical features. Decisions about the number and type of features to be 
included in the prototype are by no means straightforward and although certain 
features appear to be more central than others, it has often proven difficult to establish 
which ones take priority when we make decisions about category membership. Some 
argue that the treatment of categorisation in prototype theory works best only for 
quick unreflective judgements and that for more reflective judgements, people go 
beyond the outcome of a similarity comparison (Gelman, 2003).  
 
Another criticism of a prototypic structure concerns compositionality. When a more 
complex concept has a prototype structure, it often has emergent properties, which are 
ones that might not derive from the prototypes of its constituents. One proposed 
solution to this states that a prototype could constitute just part of the structure of a 
concept and that concepts have conceptual ‘cores’ which specify the information 
relevant to more considered judgements and which underwrite compositional 
processes (Fodor & Lepore, 1996).     
 
The process around categorisation of concepts is a complex one and there remains to 
be some methodological questions around different definitional theories. These 
questions within the literature mean often the true structure of concepts acquired by 
current techniques remain unknown. Armstrong et al. (1983) suggest that perhaps this 
indicates that there is not a ‘general theory’ of categorisation that will subsume and 
therefore explain all different domains of a concept. When considering such 
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approaches within emotion concepts, Clore and Ortony (1988) write, “the goal must 
not be to define emotion words, but to discover the structure of the psychological 
conditions to which such words apply”(p. 367). Therefore, what they suggest are 
being uncovered within prototype approaches are not necessarily new concepts of 
emotions, but explications of what is assumed to be inherent in the existing meanings 
of emotion terms (Clore & Ortony, 1988). Fox (2011) furthers this argument by 
explaining that a prototype might be either a ‘paragon’ or an ‘average’ member of the 
group, and the prototype differs between individuals and moments, making it 
contextually variant. A concept might also contain multiple prototypes. The prototype 
anchors the ideational content of the concept, but does not exclude variants, nor does 
it deem difference as deviant (Fox, 2011). According to prototype theory, perception 
truly is reality. This means that prototypical definitions rely heavily on context and 
are significantly subject to social flux. Despite being a potential criticism of the 
approach, this also means prototype analysis is particularly applicable to lay 
definitions, including that of the social construction of paranoia. Lay conceptions of 
paranoia, imagined using prototype theory as a theoretical framework, provide 
structural flexibility and inclusiveness to a concept likely to be highly heterogeneous. 
Therefore they provide a prototype that has the potential to be complementary to other 
existing definitions.  
Why a prototype approach for paranoia? 
It is arguable that everything can be conceptualised as a prototype, but this by itself 
does not make prototype analysis a worthwhile or worthless pursuit (Seuntjens, 
Zeelenberg, Breugelmans & Ven, 2015). In the case of paranoia we think a prototype 
analysis is particularly useful; not because we want to show that paranoia has a 
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prototype structure, but rather to find what that structure is. To support a prototype 
view over the classical view is not to say that the concept of paranoia cannot be 
defined, nor does it suggest that lay conceptions of paranoia must map onto experts’ 
conceptions. Rather, it proposes that concepts are systematic and orderly and can be 
organised along different lines than those assumed by the classical view. Additionally, 
it suggests that lay conceptions should be taken account of, and that utilising 
prototype theory to understand lay conceptions can support advances in the scientific 
study of paranoia. The prototype approach offers a conceptual and methodological 
framework to characterise knowledge of paranoia within the general population. 
  
Despite the prototype approach being the subject of debate, a more holistic 
understanding of experiences such as paranoia has been argued for. There is need for 
an approach that not only takes into account the multidimensionality of paranoia, but 
also experiential perspectives across the continuum. The failure to compile a 
definition representative of lay paranoia suggests that researchers are unsure of what 
to include and what not to include in the definition. When viewed from the prototype 
perspective, this inability to come to a consensus makes sense. It is possible that lay 
conceptions of paranoia, similar to many other natural language concepts, do not lend 
themselves to definition in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient critical features, 
but can be conceptualised as an indistinct category (Rosch, 1978). Defining paranoia 
as positive or negative, whether pathological or not, is over simplistic. This is further 
demonstrated by the fact that researchers and clinicians have recognised degrees of 
paranoia. Moreover, a particular experience does not qualify as either paranoid or not 
paranoid, but some experiences are more representative of paranoia than others. In 
short, we propose that, despite the seemingly inherent complexity and 
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multidimensionality of paranoia, lay conceptions are best represented in terms of a 
prototype. 
 
Like other emotions we expect the paranoia prototype to contain a range of features: 
affective, cognitive, behavioural and contextual. Based in particular on the literature 
review (Campbell, 1990; Ellett et al., 2013; Ellett & Chadwick, 2007; Freeman & 
Garety, 2003) it is expected that the paranoia prototype may represent threat, anxiety, 
self-focused attention and possibly some functional features. Developing a prototype 
analysis of paranoia will benefit both research and clinical fields. For the first time a 
definition will be provided that balances both scientific rigour with comprehensive 
coverage, facilitating understanding of paranoia’s nature, functions and context. 
Understanding the nature and structure of lay conceptions of paranoia will compel 
scholars to integrate it more systematically into a wide range of research by 
identifying commonalities and differences. Additionally, it will allow future research 
to clarify manipulation and measurement of paranoia, providing methodological 
advantages and enabling future research to manipulate or measure paranoia using 
prototypic features. This will provide participants with a collection of layperson-
accessible features of paranoia instead of the word ‘paranoia’ which could reduce 
demand characteristics and facilitate the study of paranoia in different populations. 
Finally, such advances could contribute to the design of therapeutic interventions, 
allowing clinicians to consider variation in individual conceptions, thereby adapting 
interventions to focus on the most relevant and helpful elements of paranoia.  
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1.6 Thesis plan and aims of the project  
This thesis will examine lay conceptions of paranoia in order to develop and validate 
a prototype of the construct and thereby understand how individuals themselves 
define and conceptualise paranoia. The project reports the findings of two studies, 
which are briefly introduced below.  
 
The first empirical chapter contains a two-part study, aiming to address the question 
around whether lay views of paranoia have a prototype structure, characterised by a 
core set of central and peripheral features. Consistent with prototype methodology 
(Gregg et al., 2008; Hepper et al., 2011; Seuntjens et al., 2015) the first part is 
questionnaire-based, and aims to develop the prototype by generating features of 
paranoia drawn from laypeople’s conceptions (1a). Centrality ratings will then be 
solicited (1b), which will be used to classify features as either central or peripheral to 
the paranoia prototype. Consistent with previous research (Gregg et al., 2008; 
Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2011; Kearns & Fincham, 2004), this will generate 
a pool of central (above the median) and peripheral (below the median) paranoia 
categories for use in the second part of the project. 
 
The second part (Study 2) presents the first steps involved in testing and validating 
the prototype and is specifically aimed at addressing the question of whether the 
paranoia prototype is used to guide information processing. Questions regarding the 
influence of feature centrality on free (uncued) recall and (cued) recall for features 
generated in Study 1 are addressed. Prototype theory (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; 
Rosch, 1978) proposes that central features are more readily encoded than peripheral 
ones, and so are more accessible in memory. Additionally, false recognition of central 
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features is more likely than peripheral features. It was therefore hypothesised that 
categories rated as central would be more readily encoded and retrieved than 
categories rated as peripheral to paranoia. The three hypotheses for Study 2 are listed 
below.  
 
Hypothesis 1): Significantly more central than peripheral features will be freely 
recalled.  
 
Hypothesis 2): Participants will recognise significantly more central than peripheral 
features.  
 
Hypothesis 3): Participants will falsely recognise significantly more central than 
peripheral features.  
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Chapter 2: Method  
 
The method section is divided into three parts. This includes, Study 1a and 1b, which 
focus on developing the paranoia prototype and Study 2, which concerns validating 
the prototype. Within each of these studies the study design, a description of 
participants who formed the sample, justification for the sample size and recruitment 
strategies employed, are outlined. Full details of each study procedure are provided. 
Lastly, the ethical considerations and service user involvement in the project are 
discussed. 
2.1 Study 1a  
Design  
Study 1a used a one group cross-sectional design to generate a pool of prototypical 
features of paranoia.  
Participants  
Sample  
The sample (N = 204) consisted of 140 females (69%) and 64 males (31%), with a 
mean age = 23.3 years (standard deviation (SD) = 9.21 years, Range = 18 – 56 years 
old), their ethnicity was made up of 88% White British, 1% Hispanic/Latino, 2% 
Black African/Caribbean, 4% Asian, 2.5% Multiracial, and 2.5% Other. University 
students made up 75% of the sample; the remaining 25% were lay people from the 
general population. 
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Participant inclusion criteria were people between the ages of 18-65 years old. 
Exclusion criteria were people that were non-English speaking, had an organic brain 
disorder or intellectual disability and were unable to provide informed consent.  
To ascertain a suitable number of participants for Study 1a comparable research using 
prototype theory (Hepper et al., 2011, Lambert et al., 2009; Xu, Farver, Yang, Zeng, 
2008) was considered. Such studies included samples ranging from 94-171 
participants.  
Recruitment 
English-speaking undergraduate and postgraduate university students were recruited 
via the electronic ‘campus noticeboard’ intranet facility, as well as individuals from 
the general population recruited via convenience sampling (Barker, Pistrang & Elliot, 
2003).  
Measures 
Socio-demographic information. 
All participants were asked about their age, gender, ethnicity and their employment 
status. A copy of the socio-demographic questions asked can be found in Appendix 1.  
Procedure 
The raw data for this part of the study had been collected by a research assistant but 
not analysed prior to the project commencing. All participants attended the study, 
which took place at Royal Holloway University, within working hours. Only one 
participant could take part at any one time.  
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Participants first read the information sheet (Appendix 2), highlighting the aims of the 
study. They were then asked to consent to taking part in the study and had the 
opportunity to ask questions before providing written consent to participate 
(Appendix 2). Participants were informed of their right to withdraw prior to taking 
part and that their data would not be uploaded to the secure database if they did not 
wish it to be. Participants were then asked to complete a number of socio-
demographic details (Appendix 1). Next, participants were given five minutes to list 
features and characteristics that, in their opinion, best described and distinguished 
paranoia (Appendix 3).  
 
Then participants were thanked and provided with a debriefing sheet reminding them 
of their right to withdraw and reiterating sources of support available should 
participants feel worse for having taken part in the study.  
Generating the paranoia prototype. 
The features collected needed to be organised and coded into categories to be used in 
subsequent stimulus materials. To achieve this, previous prototype approaches to 
emotion concepts (e.g. nostalgia (Hepper et al., 2011); relational boredom 
(Harasymchuk & Fehr, 2012); love (Fehr, 1988); forgiveness (Kearns & Fincham, 
2004)) have employed a wide range of different thematic processes. However, an 
elemental process shared across the literature is ‘thematising meanings’ (Holloway & 
Todres, 2003), converting lists of words or sentences into themes or features. This 
process of thematic coding is recognised as a method in its own right (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Unlike other qualitative methods, it is not bound within a specific 
theoretical or epistemological position. Hepper et al.’s (2011) methodology was the 
 53 
preferred choice of thematic content analysis in the current study due to its flexible 
approach and its ability to assess shared meanings across the sample. The stages of 
analysis to obtain features are explained below.  
Refining the paranoia prototype. 
To refine the paranoia prototype participants’ responses had to be organised in 
accordance with formats relevant to prototype methodology (e.g. Hepper et al., 2011; 
Kearns & Fincham, 2004).  
 
First a verbatim list of features identified by participants was compiled. 
The next step was to organise participants’ responses into distinct exemplars. Distinct 
exemplars were comprised of either one item from a list, or one ‘unit of meaning’ 
(Joffe & Yardley, 2004) from responses that contained multiple connected statements 
(e.g. thinking people are talking about you; looking over your shoulder; worrying for 
no reason; wary of others).  
 
Words or phrases that described idiosyncratic situations or experiences of their own 
paranoia, or that were considered irrelevant to the question were then excluded. 
The exemplars were then refined so that identical exemplars were grouped together. 
Remaining exemplars were then coded independently following prototype 
methodology employed in comparable studies (Hepper et al., 2011; Kearns & 
Fincham, 2004). This was achieved by:  
 
(a) Grouping semantically related exemplars (e.g. overthinking and overthought; fear 
and fearful) 
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(b) Grouping meaning-related exemplars (e.g. sad and upset) into categories 
(c) Grouping categories of common meaning (e.g. anguish and distress). 
 
Attempts were made to be as conservative in this approach as possible but not treat 
words or phrases that were redundant as separate attributes.  
Reliability and validity of the paranoia prototype.  
Two independent research assistants then applied the final coding scheme to all the 
exemplars. Consistent with prototype methodology (e.g. Gregg et al., 2008; Hepper et 
al., 2011) they assigned each exemplar only one feature. Cohen’s Kappa was 
calculated to ensure that the agreement between the original coding and the raters was 
not just down to chance. Cohen’s Kappa takes into account and expresses the level of 
inter-judge agreement after chance agreement has been taking into account, producing 
a ‘pure’ level of agreement. This is expressed between 0 and 1, with 0 being no better 
than chance levels and 1 being complete agreement. Following this, Study 1b was 
conducted to identify attributes that were most salient within people’s notions of 
paranoia.  
 
2.2 Study 1b 
Design  
Study 1b used a one group cross-sectional design to quantify the centrality of the 
features of paranoia generated in Study 1a. 
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Participants  
Sample. 
 The full independent sample (N =100) for Study 1b was obtained from a nonclinical 
population. Participants (N =100, 71% female 29% male; mean age = 34.8 years, SD 
= 11.2 years; Range = 20 - 64 years) were mostly Caucasian (85%), Black 
African/Caribbean (5%), Multiracial (4%), Asian (3%) or Other (3%). Although 
specific data were not collected around employment status, it was estimated that 68% 
of the sample population were psychology undergraduate students within the 18-21 
years age bracket. 
 
Participant inclusion criteria were people between the ages of 18-65 years old. 
Exclusion criteria were people that were non-English speaking, had an organic brain 
disorder or intellectual disability and were unable to provide informed consent.  
 
Previous prototype research was considered to ascertain the number of participants 
required for Study 1b (Hepper et al., 2011, Lambert et al., 2009; Fehr, 1988). These 
studies included samples ranging from 91 – 172 participants.  
Recruitment. 
The general public were recruited using convenience sampling (Barker et al., 2003) 
via an anonymous Internet survey and participated on a voluntary basis. So as not to 
be constrained by a purely student sample within this project, other methods were 
employed to recruit participants for this part of the study, including the use of 
Facebook and other social media sites. All methods provided the same summary 
information about the study. The web address allowed direct access for participation 
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as the study was completed online. Participants were only required to speak English 
and have access to an Internet enabled computer, and could therefore take part 
anywhere across the country. 
Measures  
Socio-demographic information. 
The same socio-demographic questions were used as Study 1a. A copy of the socio-
demographic questions asked can be found in Appendix 1. 
Procedures 
Rating the centrality of features. 
All participants accessed the study through a web address. The link was posted on 
social media websites, including the Royal Holloway University Message of the Day 
site. Prior to clicking on the link the title of the study, ‘Attitudes and individual 
differences – developing a lay definition of paranoia’, was available to participants as 
well as a brief synopsis of what the study involved. This read: 
 
‘If you decide to take part, I will ask you to provide some brief information about 
yourself. You will then be presented with a list of characteristics that describe 
paranoia, and will be asked to rate how important you think each one is to your 
understanding of paranoia’ 
 
Participants could then access the link and study information sheet (Appendix 4) for 
up to four weeks before deciding whether to take part in the study or not. There were 
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no restrictions on when participants could access the study and it was possible for 
multiple participants to take part at any one time.  
 
Participants first read the information sheet and were asked to consent to taking part 
in the study (Appendix 4). Participants checked a box and signed if they agreed. If 
they did not respond in the affirmative they were unable to proceed with the study. 
Participants were then asked to provide a number of socio-demographic details 
(Appendix 1). At each stage of the study participants were able to click a ‘withdraw’ 
button which would automatically fast track them to the debrief statement at the end 
of the study and their data would not be uploaded to the secure database. Participants 
were informed of their right to withdraw prior to taking part and on finishing were 
given a debriefing statement (Appendix 6). 
 
Next, participants (N =100) were asked to rate how central each category was to their 
understanding of paranoia. Previous studies using prototype methodology have used 
this approach to define the representativeness of exemplars (Harasymchuk & Fehr, 
2012; Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2011, Fehr & Russell, 1984; Fehr & Russell, 
1991; Lambert et al., 2009; Rosch, 1975; Seuntjens, et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2008;). 
Participants saw the generated list of features, the order of which was randomised 
each time by the questionnaire programme. As with relevant studies (Harasymchuk & 
Fehr, 2012; Hepper et al., 2011; Seuntjens et al., 2015), participants rated how closely 
each feature related to their view of paranoia on a Likert Scale from 1 (not at all 
related) to 8 (extremely related). 
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Then participants were thanked and provided with a debriefing sheet highlighting the 
aims of the study and reiterating sources of support available should participants feel 
worse for having taken party in the study.    
Determining central and peripheral features. 
Consistent with prototype methodology (Gregg et al., 2008; Hassebrauck, 1997; 
Hepper et al., 2011; Kearns & Fincham, 2004), in order to determine central and 
peripheral features a median-split was performed. Those features that were rated by 
participants as at or above the median were classified as central and those rated as 
below the median as peripheral. This resulted in a pool of central and peripheral 
paranoia categories generated for use in Study 2.  
 
2.3 Study 2 
Design  
Study 2 used a repeated measures experimental design to verify the prototype 
structure and to examine the way participants automatically process central and 
peripheral features of paranoia. 
 
Participants  
Sample.  
Participants (N = 125; 83% females and 17% males; mean age = 25.9 years; SD = 
13.3 years; Range = 18 – 65 years) were mostly Caucasian (71%), Asian (22%), 
Black African/Caribbean (2%), Multiracial (2%) or Other (2%). Participant inclusion 
criteria were people between the ages of 18-65 years old. Exclusion criteria were 
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people that were non-English speaking, had an organic brain disorder or intellectual 
disability and were unable to provide informed consent. Although specific data were 
not collected around employment status, it was estimated that 63% of the sample 
population were undergraduate students within the 18-21 years age bracket. 
 
A priori power analyses were conducted to ascertain the number of participants 
required for Study 2 to detect an effect similar to comparable studies. Power 
calculations were based on two previous studies. Hepper et al. (2011) and Seuntjens et 
al. (2015) were considered theoretically the most comparable samples and studies 
available. Hepper et al. (2011) reported a mean central score of 40.09 (SD = 15.31) 
and a mean peripheral score of 29.27 (SD = 13.63). The pooled standard deviation 
was used (SDpooled= 14.494) for the power calculation, detailed below. 
 
Cohen’s d = (M2 – M1) / SDpooled 
Cohen’s d = (40.09 – 29.27) / 14.494 
Cohen’s d = 0.74 
 
When comparing central to peripheral features on free recall, Hepper et al. (2011) 
demonstrated a medium-large effect size (f = .7) as defined by Cohen (1992) for 
analyses using paired sample t-tests. With a medium-large effect expected, using the 
conventions of power set at .80 and an alpha level of .05, it was estimated that a 
sample of between 26-64 participants would be required for Study 2. 
 
When comparing central to peripheral features on correct recognition, Hepper et al 
(2011) found a non-significant result. However, Seuntjens et al. (2015) demonstrated 
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a medium effect size (f = .5) for the same comparison, which would require 64 
participants, as defined by Cohen (1992). When comparing central to peripheral 
features on false recognition, Hepper et al. (2011) demonstrated a medium effect size 
(f= .48) requiring a minimum of 64 participants, as defined by Cohen (1992). Steps 
were taken to recruit as many participants as possible within the time constraints of 
the current project. 
Recruitment. 
Participants (N = 125) were made up of students from Royal Holloway University and 
the general population. Participants were asked to complete a series of short tasks in 
exchange for course credit (relevant only for the student participants). Members of the 
general population were recruited using convenience sampling (Barker et al., 2003), 
recruited via social media and participated on a voluntary basis. 
Measures 
Socio-demographic information. 
Socio-demographic questions consistent with Study 1a and 1b were used.  
Examining the relative recall of features. 
Based on approaches previously used by Hepper et al. (2011), stimuli were derived 
for presentation by dividing the 29 features of paranoia from Study 1 into two quasi-
random sets each with 7 peripheral features and 7 to 8 central features. Participants 
were randomly allocated to view either set 1 or set 2. To activate participants’ 
conceptions of paranoia each feature was embedded into a statement; for example 
“Paranoia is about …” or “Paranoia feels…”. Table 2 presents a full list of features 
and associated statements.  
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Table 2 
Full list of features and associated statements  
 
Feature Statement 
Negative experience Paranoia is a negative experience 
Evil Paranoia is evil 
Irrational actions Paranoia is about irrational actions 
Convinced/compulsion Paranoia involves being convinced 
Doubting Paranoia is feeling doubt 
Hallucinations  Paranoia involves experienced 
hallucinations  
Problematic behaviour e.g. self-
harm/drug use  
Paranoia is about problematic behaviour 
e.g. self-harm or drug use 
 
Poor interpersonal relationships Paranoia is about poor interpersonal 
relationships 
Low-esteem/self-critical Paranoia involves being self-critical 
Faulty perceptions/delusions Paranoia is experiencing faulty 
perceptions or delusions 
Temperament Paranoia is about temperament  
Mental Illness Paranoia is a mental illness 
Physical discomfort/symptoms of anxiety Paranoia is feeling physical discomfort or 
symptoms of anxiety 
Self-obsessed  Paranoia is being self-obsessed 
Emotional distress Paranoia is feeling emotional distress 
Betrayed Paranoia is feeling betrayed 
Obsessive/neurotic Paranoia is feeling obsessive or neurotic 
Blaming others Paranoia is blaming others 
Weird/mad Paranoia is feeling weird or mad 
Social isolation Paranoia is about social isolation 
 
 62 
Full list of features and associated statements continued 
 
Perceived sense of threat Paranoia is a perceived sense of threat 
Wary/watchful Paranoia is feeling wary or watchful of 
others 
Fear/anxiety Paranoia is feeling fear or anxiety 
Unstable/insecurity  Paranoia is feeling unstable or insecure 
Angry, frustrated/ irritable  Paranoia is feeling angry, frustrated or 
irritable 
Worry Paranoia is feeling worry 
Troubled thinking Paranoia is troubled thinking 
Chronic/problem  Paranoia is chronic of a problem 
 
Procedure 
The study was advertised on the Royal Holloway Experiment Management System 
and undergraduate students could sign up to take part in exchange for course credits. 
The study was also advertised on social media, so that members of the general 
population could opt to take part. Before agreeing to participate participants had 
access to the title of the study, ‘Attitudes and individual differences – Understanding 
and defining paranoia’, as well as a brief synopsis of what the study involved. This 
read:“if you decide to take part, I will ask you to provide some brief information 
about yourself. You will then be presented with statements about paranoia, and asked 
to complete a series of short tasks”. Participants could then opt to receive the 
information sheet ahead of taking part in the study, experiment timeslots were usually 
booked in a minimum of 4 weeks prior to the individual taking part in the study.  
Each participant recruited was made aware of his or her right to withdraw. Consenting 
participants signed the consent form (Appendix 5). Participants were asked to 
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complete a demographic details sheet, giving information on participant gender, age 
and ethnicity. 
 
Each participant then viewed one of the two sets of features, with each statement 
being presented for four seconds on a computer screen (Kearns & Fincham, 2004). 
Participants were then asked to complete a five-minute distractor task (a neutral word 
search) (Appendix 8). Next, in a surprise recall task, participants were given three 
minutes to list as many of the paranoia statements as possible that they had seen 
earlier, assessing free (uncued) recall. Finally, participants were given a list of all 
paranoia features from the two sets generated, and were instructed to circle all the 
categories they had seen on the screen previously, yielding indices of both correct 
recognition and false recognition, assessing recognition (cued) recall. Numbers of 
central and peripheral features recalled and recognised were then calculated. 
Participants were debriefed following their completion of the study (Appendix 7) and 
the true nature of the distractor and surprise recall tasks were explained. All data were 
anonymised before it was stored on the secure database. 
 
One judge coded each of the participant’s responses. All judgments were very 
straightforward. There were no cases where it was difficult to decipher whether a 
participant’s response corresponded with what had been presented or not. Items that 
were recalled that were not part of the paranoia prototype were omitted from the 
analyses. Six scores were computed for each participant: the number of central and 
peripheral features correctly recalled, the number of central and peripheral features 
correctly recognised and the number of central and peripheral features falsely 
recognised.  
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2.4 Ethical considerations 
Full ethical approval was granted from the Royal Holloway University Psychology 
Department Ethics Committee (RHUL DEC) on 20th April 2015 (project approval 
number ref: 2015/032), prior to the commencement of data collection. The approval 
email can be found in Appendix 9.   
 
The British Psychological Society (BPS) has published a number of guidelines that 
pertain to ethical considerations relevant to this research. These include the Code of 
Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2011) applicable to all research using humans. Within 
this project careful consideration was given to ethical issues. This was particularly 
important given the possibility that some participants could have experienced some 
increased distress during the study, due to the proposed continuity of psychotic 
experiences in the general population. This was managed by ensuring that consent 
was truly as ‘informed’ as possible. In addition to this all participants were aware of 
their right to withdraw at any point during the study. In terms of debriefing, the 
debrief pages were fully comprehensive and were provided on completion of the 
studies or if participants chose to withdraw at any point before the end of the study. In 
addition to this, contact details for the Samaritans and advice regarding accessing 
further psychological support was provided. My supervisor and myself were available 
to contact for questions and additional comments. 
 
A recent adjunct to the BPS (2011) guidelines has been Ethics Guidelines for Internet 
Mediated Research (IMR; BPS, 2013), which highlights how special consideration 
may be needed to certain principles in an IMR context. Additionally, Conducting 
Research on the Internet (BPS, 2007) was consulted for the current research in its 
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capacity to provide more general guidance for all online psychological research, as 
well as adhering to the principles outlined in the BPS’ Supplementary Guidance on 
the use of Social Media (BPS, 2012). The current study utilised recruitment through 
social media as one method of reaching potential participants for part 1b and 2 of the 
project. The guidelines were adhered to in a number of ways. Prior to completing the 
study a tick box option was put in place to confirm that participants had read and 
understood the information. Until this was checked participants were not able to 
proceed (IMR; BPS, 2013). The greater degree of ‘distance’ from participants in IMR 
can lead to difficulties maintaining levels of control over research procedures and 
environment. This may manifest in not being able to control or verify certain aspects, 
such as the environmental conditions under which participants are responding (e.g. 
are they watching television at the same time). This may result in variations occurring 
that might lead to invalid data and conclusions. Attempts were made to manage this 
by prompting participants to minimise distractions around them where possible, to 
allow them to fully concentrate on the study. A lack of control may also prevent the 
researcher from monitoring participants’ reactions and behaviours. This may 
jeopardise the ability to detect when a participant has withdrawn, and thus properly 
present them with debrief information. The online programme for Study 1b had the 
functionality to allow participants to withdraw at any point. However, participants 
who clicked to exit the study early were directed to debriefing information in an 
attempt to manage these potential issues.  
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2.5 Service User Involvement 
A small student user group of five volunteers from the psychology department were 
recruited using convenience sampling (Barker et al., 2003) using a blanket email 
requesting their involvement. Recruitment of a clinical service user group was not felt 
suitable; particularly as the project focused on lay conceptions of paranoia, with the 
assumption that this was not necessarily the same as a clinical presentation of 
paranoia. 
 
The group were involved mainly in the design element of the research. Consultation 
was implemented to gain feedback on the design and clarity of the information and 
debrief sheets. For example, the information sheet was shortened to fit onto one page 
to make it more accessible and the language simplified in order to be appropriate for a 
lay population. The group also felt it was important that the study participants could 
opt to receive information on the findings of the research project. Adjustments were 
made in accordance with their comments. 
 
The student user group also supported the development of an effective recruitment 
strategy, offering specific advice on where and how to best advertise the study. They 
provided insight into the most popular online forums associated with Royal Holloway 
University (e.g. Message of the Day). Ideas such as putting posters around campus 
were discarded as the group felt this would be a less fruitful recruitment strategy.    
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Chapter 3: Results 
 
The results chapter begins with a data analysis section that outlines the main statistical 
methods used for the hypotheses as well as general conventions adhered to 
throughout. This is followed by a detailed description of the results from Study 1a and 
1b, which focus on the development of the paranoia prototype. Results for Study 2, 
which was conducted to validate the paranoia prototype, are then presented.   
Data Analysis 
The data for the current study were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences version 21.0 (SPSS, version 21.0). Details are provided regarding the 
process of examining the normality of distributions, including transformations 
undertaken for non-normal distributions, and the steps taken to deal with outliers. For 
data interpretation, exact p – values are given, unless otherwise stated. Findings are 
reported to two decimal places with the exception of percentages that are reported to 
one decimal place. All hypothesis testing was two-tailed. 
 
To address the hypothesis that formed Study 1a and 1b, that paranoia would have a 
prototypic structure, thematic content analysis was employed.   
 
To address the hypotheses that formed Study 2 concerning the validation of the 
paranoia prototype, paired-samples t-tests were calculated on Free Recall, Correct 
Recognition and False Recognition of central and peripheral features.  
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3.1 Study 1a  
Refining the paranoia prototype  
The total verbatim list of exemplars identified by participants was 1781, with 
participants generating an average of 8.7 exemplars each. Participant’s responses 
were then organised in accordance with steps outlined in the method chapter. 
 
First, idiosyncratic situations or experiences of individual’s own paranoia or that were 
considered irrelevant to the question were excluded. Examples of idiosyncratic items 
included exemplars such as ‘no boyfriend, ‘going on trains and buses’, ‘house’, 
‘money’, ‘black’ and ‘movies’. A total of 99 responses in total were considered 
idiosyncratic and were discarded. This left a total of 1682 items. 
 
In accordance with the concept of paranoia forming a prototype (as opposed to a 
classical definition), no single exemplar was mentioned by all of the participants. 
Rather, there was substantial variability in how frequently individual exemplars came 
to mind. There were exemplars (e.g. evil, betrayal) that were only listed by 2 
individuals and at the other extremes were exemplars (e.g. fear) listed by 87 of the 
participants. Between these extremes was no clear break between items frequently 
and those less frequently cited. For example there were exemplars that were listed by 
75 (anxiety), 41 (mistrust), 22 (lonely) and 7 individuals (threat). This gradual change 
in availability is consistent with the idea of an internal structure, that prototypical 
members shade gradually into non-prototypical members and then into non-members 
with no sharp boundary to be found (Russell, 1991).      
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However, participants did agree on certain exemplars. For ease of presentation, the 
exemplars of paranoia are described in terms of clusters or themes that characterised 
the responses. There was one large cluster of exemplars listed that had strong 
associations with anxiety (e.g. anxiety, fear, worry, scared). On the other hand, 
exemplars that may have been considered intuitively relevant (based on the previous 
literature) to a definition of paranoia, such as threat, harm or delusions, were listed by 
significantly fewer participants than perhaps expected.  
 
Next, features were organised into distinct exemplars (comprising of either one item 
from a list or one ‘unit of meaning’) (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). Identical exemplars 
were grouped together. For example, anxious and afraid were included within a 
‘fear/anxiety’ feature and distrust, mistrust of others and suspect, were all included in 
the feature ‘doubting’. Once completed, a total of 271 distinct exemplars remained. 
From these 271 exemplars an initial coding scheme was developed which contained 
29 features. Table 3 represents the 29 features, sample exemplars and the frequencies 
of exemplars listed within each feature out of the total 1682. 
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Table 3 
Lowest – highest percentages of exemplars listed within a feature  
Feature 
 
Exemplars written by participants  
N (%) times 
listed 
Evil Evil, malicious, Dark 7 (0.4) 
Betrayed Lies, cheating, betrayed 9 (0.5) 
Blaming others Accusing, attacking, Blame directed on others, blame 10 (0.6) 
Temperament Mental attitude, temperament 14 (0.8) 
Self-obsessed Self-obsessed, introversion, self-obsession, me-orientated 17 (1.0) 
Low-esteem/self-critical Low-esteem, lack of confidence, self-critical 19 (1.1) 
Negative experience Result of a bad experience 22 (1.3) 
Poor interpersonal relationships Social paralysis, poor interpersonal relationships, Dependency 24 (1.4) 
Chronic/problem Difficult, Problem, Chronic 24 (1.4) 
Convinced/compulsion Forceful, Convinced, imposing 25 (1.5) 
Angry, frustrated/irritable Angry, cross, annoyance, Frustration 30 (1.8) 
Hallucinations Hallucinate, Hearing things, Seeing things, Visions 32 (1.9) 
Problematic behaviour e.g. self-harm/drug use Self-harm, Self-abuse, weed, substances, Addict 34 (2.0) 
Weird/mad Weird, Inexplicable, odd, Unnatural 34 (2.0) 
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Lowest – highest percentages of exemplars listed within a feature continued   
 
Irrational actions Irrational actions, Fast paced walking, Shoulder checks 34 (2.0) 
Confined/repressed Confined, Enclosed, entrapment, Repression 41 (2.4) 
Unstable/insecurity Unstable, Insecurity, Uncertainty, fear of unknown 42 (2.5) 
Obsessive/neurotic Obsessive, Fixation, stubborn, neurotic 64 (3.8) 
Faulty perceptions/delusions Delusional, delusion, misjudgement, Faulty perception of others and self 66 (3.9) 
Emotional distress Emotional, Emotionally painful, Emotive, Sad, miserable 68 (4.0) 
Perceived sense of threat Threatened, endangered, Threat from others, Vulnerable, Helpless 69 (4.1) 
Physical discomfort/symptoms of anxiety Anxiety attacks, panic attack, Heart beating fast, shaking 71 (4.2) 
Troubled thinking Troubled, tormented, negative thoughts, Over-thinking 73 (4.3) 
Social isolation Loneliness, isolation, lonely, alone 78 (4.6) 
Wary/watchful Wary, Cautious, Watching, Aware 81 (4.8) 
Doubting Distrust, doubt, not trusting 86 (5.1) 
Worry Excessive worry, thinking something bad is going to happen, 95 (5.6) 
Mental Illness Illness, Condition, Hormonal imbalance, Personality Disorder 107 (6.3) 
Fear/anxiety Fear, Anxiety, Afraid, Terrified 406 (24.7) 
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At this point the results indicated that there were neither necessary nor sufficient 
features, as one would expect to find given a classical definition of a concept. Of 
interest, the majority of exemplars listed were negative in tone; possible positive 
functions of paranoia were largely not named. Only one participant listed ‘self-
protective’ as an exemplar. Furthermore, a sizeable proportion of participants listed 
exemplars that indicated a view of paranoia through a clinical or psychiatric lens (e.g. 
schizophrenia, mental illness, depression). A small proportion of participants also 
listed features that were pejorative and demonstrated a condemnatory view of 
paranoia (e.g. evil, insane, weird, crazy, freak, mad).    
Inter-rater reliability of the paranoia prototype  
Two independent research assistants then applied the final coding scheme to all 
exemplars. Inter-rater agreement for the two raters against the 29 features are shown 
below. 
Table 4 
Inter-rater agreement 
 
 Inter-rate agreement 
(kappa) 
Rater 1 .70 
Rater 2 .74 
 
 
The inter-rater agreement for the two raters indicated a high level of agreement 
between raters, with both kappa levels meeting the convention of .7 (Cohen, 1960). 
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There was no need to revise discrepant codes, as the Kappa values both met 
convention. Therefore, the codes applied by the original coder were retained. 
Features of paranoia  
Many of the features generated were at a high level of abstraction (e.g. ‘emotional 
distress’, ‘social isolation’, ‘blame’) and some features were mentioned much more 
frequently than others. ‘Fear/anxiety’ was the most frequently mentioned (406 times) 
followed by ‘mental illness’ (107 times). There were a proportion of participants that 
generated multiple exemplars that fell in the same feature. The particularly high 
frequency of ‘fear/anxiety’ exemplars is partially explained by this phenomenon.  
 
General themes that emerged from the features were that the prototype of paranoia 
included cognitive processes (e.g. worry, troubled thinking, faulty 
perceptions/delusions) and affective processes (e.g. emotional distress) of paranoia. In 
addition to this, participants listed behavioural aspects and features suggestive of 
expectation that paranoia leads to interpersonal difficulties (e.g. social isolation, 
doubting and blaming others). There was also reference to possible causal factors or 
triggers to paranoia (e.g. problematic behaviour, negative experience), but these were 
only represented by two of the features.  
 
3.2 Study 1b  
Prototypicality of features  
The objective of Study 1b was to quantify the centrality of the features of paranoia 
generated in Study 1a. Centrality ratings are shown in Table 5. Centrality ratings 
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ranged from 2.08 to 7.05; that is, some attributes were considered as expressing the 
very meaning of the concept to a greater extent than others.   
 
Intraclass correlation   
As with previous relevant literature (Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2011; Kearns 
& Fincham, 2004;), in order to determine the absolute as well as relative agreement of 
the participant’s ratings the intraclass correlation (ICC) was calculated. This was 
achieved by transposing the data, treating the 29 features as cases and the 100 
participants as items, before calculating the ICC. The participant’s ratings of the 
features were found to be extremely reliable (ICC = .98, 95% confidence interval = 
.97 - .99).  
Determining central and peripheral features  
Because the features were intended for use in following studies, it was necessary to 
decide which features should be considered central and which should be regarded as 
peripheral. In order to determine this a median-split was performed. This was 
calculated by ordering the mean ratings of each of the 29 features, demonstrating that 
the median was 5.39. Those features that were rated by participants as at or above the 
median were classified as central and those rated as below the median as peripheral. 
This resulted in a pool of 15 central and 14 peripheral paranoia features generated for 
use in Study 2. It should be noted, however, that this division of features is not meant 
to imply that there is a clear line demarcating central and peripheral features. Rather 
centrality is considered to be on a continuum (Kearns & Fincham, 2004). Table 5 
presents the 29 features, with frequencies generated from Study 1a and centrality 
ratings from Study 1b.  
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Table 5 
Features of Paranoia, Frequencies Generated in Study 1a and Centrality Ratings in Study 1b 
 Study 1a Study 1b 
Feature N M SD 
Central    
Perceived sense of threat 69 7.05 1.27 
Fear/anxiety 406 6.93 1.29 
Worry 95 6.75 1.47 
Faulty perceptions/ delusions 66 6.38 1.50 
Emotional distress 68 6.28 1.58 
Unstable/insecurity  42 6.02 1.46 
Physical discomfort/symptoms of anxiety 71 6.02 1.71 
Obsessive/neurotic 64 5.93 1.84 
Troubled thinking 73 5.92 1.53 
Wary/watchful 81 5.85 1.79 
Irrational actions 34 5.68 1.71 
Mental Illness 107 5.66 1.79 
Negative experience 22 5.54 1.66 
Social isolation 78 5.40 1.87 
Convinced/compulsion 25 5.39 1.82 
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Features of Paranoia, Frequencies Generated in Study 1a and Centrality Ratings in Study 1b continued 
 
 
Peripheral    
Chronic/problem 24 5.16 1.73 
Doubting 86 5.06 1.80 
Low-esteem/self-critical 19 4.69 1.90 
Problematic behaviour e.g. self-harm/drug use 34 4.34 1.89 
Hallucinations  32 4.07 2.04 
Confined/repression 41 3.95 1.65 
Angry, frustrated/irritable 30 3.92 1.75 
Poor interpersonal relationships 24 3.88 1.91 
Temperament  14 3.56 1.87 
Self obsessed 17 3.49 1.97 
Blaming others 10 3.49 1.99 
Betrayed 9 3.32 1.91 
Weird/mad 34 3.22 1.89 
Evil 7 2.08 1.43 
 
Note. Features are listed in order of Study 1b centrality ratings, which used a scale from 1 (not at all related to paranoia) to 8 (extremely 
related to paranoia). Features rated above the median (5.39) were classified as central, and those below the median as peripheral 
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Comparing central and peripheral features  
Central features were largely a mix of nouns and adjectives. Many of these features 
focused on derivatives of anxiety (e.g. fear/anxiety, worry, perceived sense of threat). 
Possible triggers, causal or consequential factors, such as mental illness or social 
isolation, were also rated as central. Cognitive processes also featured highly in the 
central categories (e.g. delusions, worry, troubled thinking, faulty perceptions and 
delusions). In contrast peripheral codes were more made up of verbs and were largely 
more pejorative in nature (e.g. self-obsessed, blaming others, weird/mad, evil). 
Despite some of these codes not being the least frequently listed attributes in Study 
1b, they were all lowly ranked with regards to their centrality. Although at this point 
not conclusive, the findings supported the hypothesis, offering encouragement that lay 
paranoia appears to have a prototypical structure characterised by a core set of central 
features. 
3.3 Study 2  
Data Screening 
Prior to carrying out any statistical analysis, descriptive statistics were explored which 
confirmed that all observed data were within expected ranges. The data set was 
screened for missing data, of which there were no missing values (N = 125). Screens 
were undertaken to ensure that all assumptions for the use of parametric analyses 
were met (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind, 2001) and for any outliers. 
Outliers      
Outliers were investigated by observing the frequency outputs and generating 
boxplots for all variables. An outlier was defined as an extreme score if the data point 
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was more than three standard deviations from the mean of the variable of interest 
(Field, 2009). Within the variable ‘Free Recall Central’, five outliers were identified. 
These were all 0 scores. However Tabachnick et al. (2001) suggest that where 
numerical indicators suggested datasets were normally distributed, as they were in 
this instance, then extreme scores should be retained in the dataset. Retention of these 
scores prevented a loss of power and because the sample was relatively large in the 
present study, the chance that any extreme scores would have a disproportionate 
influence was lowered (Field, 2009; Tabachnick et al., 2001).     
Parametric Data Assumptions 
The distributions of central and peripheral features for Free Recall, Correct 
Recognition and False Recognition were checked for normality by inspecting their 
histograms with normal curves and calculating skewness and kurtosis z-scores using 
the following formulae: 
 
Z skewness =         S – 0   Z kurtosis = √   K – 0 
                        SE skewness           SE kurtosis 
 
A distribution was considered normal if a z-score for both skewness and kurtosis was 
less than 3.29 (p <.001) (Field, 2009). 
 
Correct Recognition for peripheral features was negatively skewed (z = -3.83 p < 
.001). A transformation squaring the data was applied (Tabachnick et al., 2001) which 
resulted in a normal distribution with acceptable levels of skew (z = - 0.25 p < .001) 
and kurtosis (z = 1.87 p < .001).  
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The False Recognition central variable was positively skewed (z = 3.71, p < .001). A 
square root transformation was applied (Tabachnick et al., 2001) which resulted in a 
normal distribution with acceptable levels of skew (z = - 1.90 p < .001) and kurtosis 
(z = 1.30 p < .001). 
 
The False Recognition peripheral variable was also positively skewed (z = 5.17 p < 
.001). A square root transformation was applied (Tabachnick et al., 2001) which 
resulted in a normal distribution with acceptable levels of skew (z = 1.48 p < .001) 
and kurtosis (z = 1.87 p < .001).  
 
The Free Recall central and peripheral and Correct Recognition central variables all 
had acceptable levels of skew and kurtosis. 
Statistical Analyses of the Hypotheses 
Descriptive statistics for Free Recall, Correct Recognition and False Recognition for 
the entire sample are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Descriptive statistics for Free Recall, Correct Recognition and False Recognition for 
the entire sample 
 
  Central   Peripheral  
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Free Recall 2.51 1.22 0 - 6 1.84 1.23 0 - 6 
Correct Recognition 4.94 1.54 1 - 8 5.10 1.68 0 - 8 
False Recognition 1.42 1.19 0 - 5 .67 .82 0 – 3 
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Hypothesis 1): Significantly more central than peripheral features will be freely 
recalled.  
 
Central and peripheral Free Recall of features was compared using a paired-samples t- 
test. This found that participants remembered significantly more central than 
peripheral features (t (124) = 4.9, p < .001), thereby indicating that Hypothesis 1 was 
supported.    
 
Hypothesis 2): Participants will recognise significantly more central than peripheral 
features.  
 
Correct Recognition of central and peripheral features was compared using a paired-
samples t-test. The descriptive statistics indicated that participants recognised slightly 
more peripheral than central features, but the difference was not found to be 
significant (t (124) = - 1.4, p = .177). This indicates that Hypothesis 2 was not 
supported.          
 
Hypothesis 3): Participants will falsely recognise significantly more central than 
peripheral features.  
 
False Recognition of central and peripheral features was compared using a paired-
samples t-test. Participants falsely recognised significantly more central than 
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peripheral features (t (124) = 7.1, p < .001). This indicates Hypothesis 3 was 
supported.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1 Overview  
The project examined lay conceptions of paranoia to help develop and validate a 
prototype of the construct of paranoia thereby developing the understanding of how 
individuals themselves define and conceptualise the construct. The project reports the 
findings of two studies. The first aimed to investigate whether lay views of paranoia 
have a prototype structure, characterised by a core set of central and peripheral 
features. Study 1a and 1b provided evidence that the concept of paranoia does have a 
prototype structure, such that participants identified features of a concept, with some 
features being regarded as more characteristic of the concept than others (Rosch, 
1975). The second study (Study 2) presented the initial steps involved in testing and 
validating the prototype by investigating the influence of feature centrality on recall 
and recognition. Study 2 found that two out of three hypotheses were supported. 
Significantly more central than peripheral features were both freely recalled and 
falsely recognised. However, no significant differences were found between correct 
recognition of central and peripheral features. The main findings will be discussed in 
relation to relevant existing theory and empirical research, incorporating suggestions 
for future research. The study’s strengths and limitations will then be outlined, 
followed by discussion of potential theoretical and clinical implications of the 
research, finishing with concluding remarks. 
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4.2 Summary of Main Findings  
Study 1a – Feature generation.  
The objective of Study 1a was to generate a pool of prototypical features of paranoia, 
to uncover whether lay paranoia had a prototypic structure. The objective was 
determined by empirical and theoretical considerations provided in the introduction. It 
was partially exploratory as research into developing and validating a lay prototype of 
paranoia was novel. The literature that was reviewed focused on comparable emotion 
concepts within prototype literature (e.g. Hepper et al., 2011; Fitness & Fletcher, 
1993; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Lambert et al., 2009; Russell, 1991), as well as 
considering the current theoretical understanding of paranoia, its multidimensionality 
(Bebbington et al., 2013; Freeman et al., 2011; Johns & van Os, 2001) and the 
challenges of finding a definition that accurately represents such a heterogeneous 
construct. Initial analysis sought to establish if lay conceptions of paranoia had a 
prototypic structure.  
 
Results of Study 1a demonstrated that many of the exemplars generated were at a 
high level of abstraction. This likely reflects the abstract, heterogeneous nature of the 
construct itself. This may also account for the fact that fewer features of paranoia (n = 
29) were obtained as compared with other emotion prototypes such as commitment (n 
= 40, Fehr, 1988), love (n = 68; Fehr 1988), gratitude (n = 52; Lambert et al., 2009); 
although the numbers were more comparable with nostalgia (n = 35; Hepper et al., 
2011) and respect (n = 31; Frei & Shaver, 2002). The similarities and differences 
found in the number of common features from one study to the other may reflect 
expected differences in the number of features generated according to the nature of 
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the construct. Alternatively it may be a reflection of the similarities, or lack of, in the 
procedures implemented, particularly as different methodological approaches have 
been employed across the prototype literature. For example, within Fehr’s (1988) 
study, the instructions given to participants prior to generating a list of features 
provided a story-like description or a list of attributes to model to participants what 
was required of them. Whereas Lambert et al. (2009) (adapted from Fehr & Russell, 
1984) used the same instructions as this thesis, but additionally informed participants 
to: “Imagine that you are explaining the word gratitude to someone who has no 
experience of gratitude. Include the obvious. However, try not to just free-associate. 
We’re interested in what is common to instances of gratitude. Remember that these 
attributes can be positive or negative” (p. 1196). Participants were then instructed to 
write down characteristics that came to mind when they heard the word gratitude. 
This issue could be examined in future studies by varying the participant instructions 
in a systematic way and examining the impact on feature generation.  
 
No single exemplar was mentioned by all participants. Rather there was substantial 
variability in how frequently exemplars came to mind. For example, 40% of 
participants mentioned fear as a feature of paranoia, whereas only 8% mentioned 
delusions. However, participants did agree on certain features. Frequently listed 
features included anxiety (listed by 37% of participants), worry (38%) and scared 
(28%). On the other hand, some features that were thought to be intuitively relevant to 
a definition of paranoia, such as threat or harm (Freeman & Garety, 2000), were listed 
by fewer than 4% and 1.5% of participants respectively. The high level of abstraction 
and variability of exemplars indicates that there are neither necessary nor sufficient 
features, as one would expect to find given a classical definition of a concept. This 
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gradual change in availability is consistent with the idea of an internal structure, that 
prototypical members shade gradually into non-prototypical members and then into 
non-members with no sharp boundary to be found (Russell, 1991).   
 
It is important to note that there was one particularly large cluster of features that was 
related to anxiety. Participants generated multiple exemplars that fell within the same 
category and this was particularly true within the ‘fear/anxiety’ feature. Therefore the 
high frequency of ‘fear/anxiety’ exemplars is explained somewhat by this 
phenomenon. This presented a slight complication during coding. On one hand, such 
exemplar duplication provides only redundant semantic information (Gregg et al., 
2008). For example, if a participant successively reported that paranoia was ‘fear’ and 
‘terror’ then they would essentially be characterising paranoia as fear or anxiety (the 
category label) twice. By this view, duplicate exemplars should be ignored. However, 
such exemplar duplication provides useful psychological information. In participants’ 
search for a new characteristic to report, participants may have reiterated one similar 
to, or synonymous with, a previous characteristic because of the continuing 
accessibility of the overarching category (Gregg et al., 2008). Such findings would 
suggest that many participants regard the categories ‘fear/anxiety’ or ‘mental illness’ 
(both frequently cited) as being highly applicable to paranoia and therefore duplicate 
exemplars should be acknowledged. 
 
Referents to anxiety are consistent with literature into paranoia within the general 
population, demonstrating substantial links between affect and paranoia (Freeman et 
al., 2002; Freeman et al, 2010; Freeman et al., 2011), specifically anxiety (Bebbington 
et al., 2013). Referents to mental health, including differential diagnoses (e.g. anxiety 
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or depression), are also in line with theoretical conceptions within clinical populations 
that acknowledge that paranoia as a ‘pure’ experience is rare and that comorbidity is 
the ‘norm’ (Miller & Holden, 2010). Such studies link paranoia with other disorders 
including depression (Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os 2003), anxiety 
disorders (Allen, Freeman, Johns & Mcguire, 2006) and personality disorders (APA, 
1994). The relevance of mental illness within lay conceptions of paranoia, parallels 
early empirical psychiatric views of paranoia as a clinical experience (Esterberg & 
Compton, 2009), but is less reflective of current theoretical positions that have tried to 
move away from the pathologisation of the concept.   
 
Generally, features elicited in Study 1a followed a theme of being largely negative in 
affective tone: participants wrote about feelings of fear, torment and loneliness. Of 
interest, there were no features that were demonstrably positive in tone or that 
acknowledged the potential adaptive or functional aspects of paranoia. This is 
discrepant from empirical literature on paranoia that, in the last decade, has begun to 
agree on an evolutionary perspective, acknowledging the possibility of paranoia being 
an understandable and even appropriate response to certain situations and life events 
(Bebbington et al., 2013; Ellett et al., 2003; Kelleher, Jenner & Cannon, 2010; 
Morrison et al., 2011; Preti & Cella, 2010). This is a position that has now garnered 
considerable support. However, the paranoia prototype did not feature such aspects. 
On the contrary, the prototype appeared to be negative and clinical in nature. The 
findings of Study 1a are perhaps not surprising as representation of dominant 
psychiatric discourses have been shown to be present within lay views (Gleeson, 
1991). However, one possible explanation of this finding is the high proportion of 
psychology students recruited. Psychology students might be expected to be more 
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likely than other members of the general population, or even non-psychology 
students, to view paranoia from a clinical perspective. Future research should 
replicate Study 1a with members of the general population.  
 
An additional explanation for this is the way in which the task was set up, as it 
elicited characteristics, rather than individuals’ understanding of paranoia within an 
everyday context. This means that some aspects of the prototype may exist, but have 
not yet been elicited. The first example of this was the study not being able to 
objectively establish if some exemplars listed did have positive connotations or not. 
There was just one question that participants responded to, where they were asked to 
list features and characteristics that, in their opinion, best described and distinguished 
paranoia accurately. Future research could adapt the procedural instructions of Study 
1a to prompt participants to look at whether features could be considered to be 
positive or negative. Additionally, despite being written about extensively within 
other literature domains and a general consensus that more global feelings of paranoia 
have risen within western societies in recent years, the features did not reflect 
paranoia as a societal phenomenon (Rose, 1989) or any notion of a ‘paranoia culture’ 
(e.g. societal mistrust or lack of social cohesion (Freeman & Freeman, 2008)). It is 
again possible that both of these findings could be explained by the way in which the 
task was set up, meaning that these specific features were not elicited.  
 
In summary, the results from Study 1a indicate that there are neither necessary nor 
sufficient features, as one would expect to find given a classical definition of a 
concept. The findings have provided initial support for lay conceptions of paranoia 
having a prototypic structure, although it is important that this aspect of the study 
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receives replication due to its relative infancy as a developing idea. Although there 
was overlap between experts’ and laypersons’ conceptualisations of paranoia, there 
were also differences noted. Study 1a revealed that the prototype of paranoia 
comprises largely of negative features or ones involving negative consequences. 
Participants did not seem to spontaneously indicate that there were distinctions 
between clinical and lay paranoia. Anxiety and mental illness appeared to be 
particularly relevant in peoples’ conceptions, paralleling much of the early psychiatric 
views of paranoia as a clinical experience (Esterberg & Compton, 2009). The lack of 
acknowledgement for adaptive functions further demonstrates that lay conceptions 
mirror clinical narratives that have dominated much of the intellectual history of 
paranoia. It is also possible that peoples’ conceptions of paranoia just do not feature 
adaptive aspects; this is perhaps not surprising as the word itself tends to be used in 
non-complimentary social contexts. Having said this, the acknowledgement of a range 
of different processes involved (including cognitive, affective, behavioural and 
interpersonal processes) within the features, is more in line with current literature that 
views paranoia as multifaceted, entailing a combination of elements. This suggests 
that lay views may have somewhat moved away from the linguistic origins of 
paranoia.  
Study 1b – Prototypicality of paranoia. 
If a concept possesses a prototypical structure, then certain features must not only be 
representative of the concept, participants must be also able to make meaningful 
judgments about whether the features of the concept are central or peripheral (Kearns 
& Fincham, 2004). Moreover, there must be substantial agreement on these 
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judgments. Therefore, the objective of Study 1b was to gather information about the 
centrality of the paranoia features gathered from Study 1a. 
 
The first important finding from Study 1b was that participants considered some 
features to be more prototypical of paranoia than others. Moreover, they agreed on 
these ratings (i.e. the ICC was found to be extremely reliable). The fact participants 
found this to be a meaningful task fulfils the first criterion for demonstrating that a 
concept is prototypically organised.  
 
Comparisons between Study 1b’s mean centrality ratings with the frequencies from 
Study 1a (see Table 5, page 75) indicated that some features were both listed 
frequently and given high centrality ratings (e.g. fear/anxiety and worry). This is also 
consistent with the construct of paranoia having a prototype structure. There were, 
however, noteworthy discrepancies where frequency and centrality ratings did not 
directly reflect one another. For example, mental illness was the second most 
frequently listed feature in Study 1a, but was ranked near the lower half of central 
features. In addition to this, doubting was frequently listed in Study 1a yet was ranked 
as peripheral. Some features that had not ranked highly in Study 1a, such as perceived 
sense of threat, were then rated as very central to lay conceptions of paranoia. 
 
Despite the associations between frequency and centrality being somewhat low, this is 
consistent with results found in other prototype analyses (Fehr & Russell, 1984; 
Hassebrauck, 1997; Kearns & Fincham, 2004). This finding implies that the most 
readily recalled features are not necessarily always the most central. Hassebrauck 
(1997) proposes that frequency and centrality measure different aspects of internal 
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structure. When individuals are asked to freely recall the paranoia features, all 
different features readily come to mind. It is possible that during the free-listing task 
participants used a ‘what comes to mind first is appropriate’ heuristic, whereas, the 
centrality ratings likely require more systematic processing of information (Kearns & 
Fincham, 2004). This suggests that even though people report that these components 
are not good indicators of paranoia when given time to critically evaluate them, they 
still incorporate them into the prototype of paranoia when they are processing less 
systematically. It is possible that this may explain why some of the more pejorative 
features (e.g. weird/mad) were listed relatively frequently within the free-listing task, 
but were ranked as some of the most peripheral during Study 1b, once participants 
were asked to make decisions about them with regards to their centrality. Indeed this 
fits with Hassebrauck’s (1997) suppositions and with literature that argues that 
prototype theory’s treatment of categorisation perhaps works best for quick 
unreflective judgements and that with more reflective judgements, people go beyond 
the outcome of a similarity comparison (Gelman, 2003). 
 
Another possible explanation for the differences observed between Study 1a and 1b, 
might be the different samples used, particularly as Study1b’s participants were older 
with a slightly higher proportion from the general population. Alternatively, the 
findings could be explained to some extent by social desirability. When it came to 
rating centrality, participants may have felt that the politically correct view was not to 
see ‘weird, mad or evil’ as central to paranoia.  
 
In support of the findings of Study 1a, Study 1b similarly demonstrated lay 
conceptions of paranoia’s variability. These findings are concordant with current 
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empirical views that paranoia is multidimensional (Freeman, 2007; Garety, Everitt & 
Hemsley, 1988; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Kendler, Glazer & Morgenstern, 1983), 
with different facets of the prototype mapping directly on to dimensions listed as 
pertinent within the literature. For example, several of the central features that had not 
featured as frequently during the free listing (Study 1a), fit more with theoretical 
conceptions of paranoia. Particularly pertinent were perceived sense of threat, 
conviction, preoccupation (represented by the ‘convinced/compulsion’ feature) and 
emotional distress. These findings are consistent both with intuitive expectation and 
widely accepted theoretical conceptions of paranoia (e.g. Freeman & Garety, 2000). 
 
Further building on Study 1a, Study 1b also found anxiety related features 
substantially represented within central features of the prototype. This is consistent 
with research demonstrating substantial links between affect and paranoia (Freeman 
et al., 2002; Freeman et al., 2010; Freeman et al., 2011). At present, the evidence for a 
link between anxiety and paranoia is reasonably strong, specifically implying close 
structured relationships between worry, anxiety and paranoia (all concerning the 
theme of anticipation of threat) (Bebbington et al., 2013; Bentall et al., 2009; Ben-
Zeev, Elligton, Swendsen & Granholm, 2010; Freeman et al., 2011; Varghese et al., 
2009). The feature ‘worry’ itself was also both frequently listed and rated as central to 
the paranoia prototype. This fits with evidence that has demonstrated paranoid 
thinking and anxiety-related cognitive processes are linked (Freeman, 2007). For 
example, evidence indicates that almost two-thirds of individuals with persecutory 
delusions have a worry thinking style (even about matters unrelated to paranoia) 
(Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2007). It is argued that anxiety 
generally facilitates creation of thoughts of a paranoid content, and that anxiety-
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related cognitive processes (such as worry) contribute to the maintenance and distress 
associated with the experience. Anxiety has repeatedly been found to be predictive of 
the occurrence of paranoid thoughts (Freeman et al., 2003; Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005) and of the persistence of persecutory delusions 
(Startup et al., 2007). Moreover, it has been shown in nonclinical groups that paranoid 
thoughts build upon common interpersonal anxieties and worries (Freeman, Garety, 
Bebbington, Slater et al., 2005; Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et al., 2005). 
However, paranoia is more than just excessive fear or anxiety, as was demonstrated 
within the prototype.   
 
The prototype of paranoia included cognitive processes, other than worry (e.g. faulty 
perceptions/delusions), that featured highly within central components. This is fitting 
with large aspects of the paranoia literature that have focused on threat beliefs and 
misperceptions. Threat beliefs have been shown to become paranoid when 
accompanied by biases in reasoning, such as reduced data gathering (Garety & 
Freeman, 1999), failure to generate alternate explanations for an experience (Freeman 
et al., 2004) and strong confirmatory reasoning bias (Freeman, Garety, McGuire & 
Kuipers, 2005). When reasoning biases are present, the suspicions are more likely to 
become near certainties; the threat beliefs become held with a conviction unwarranted 
by the evidence and may then be considered delusional (Freeman, 2007). 
 
Additionally, anxiety-related behavioural elements were apparent within central 
features of the prototype that align with theoretical conceptions. Examples of these 
central features were ‘irrational actions’ and ‘wary/watchful’. Many exemplars within 
these features were consistent with examples of safety behaviours found to be 
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associated with paranoia (Freeman et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2007). Individuals 
who feel threatened often carry out actions designed to prevent their feared 
catastrophe from occurring; this has been termed ‘safety behaviour’ (Salkovskis, 
1991). Literature has demonstrated that safety behaviours are utilised in both clinical 
and nonclinical populations (Freeman et al., 2007; Simpson, MacGregor, Cavanagh, 
Dudley, 2012).  
 
Of interest, the paranoia prototype also matched themes found in qualitative research 
uncovering lay perspectives within clinical populations (Boyd & Gumley, 2007; 
Carrick, Mitchell, Powell, & Lloyd, 2004; Hirschfield, Smith, Trower, & Griffin, 
2005; McNally & Goldberg, 1997). Themes such as fear, vulnerability, emotional 
distress, uncertainty and a sense of being under attack (Boyd & Gumley, 2007) could 
be seen to varying degrees throughout central features of the prototype. However, 
elements of keeping oneself safe in dangerous situations or possible benefits that 
emerge from paranoid experiences identified by service users (McCarthy-Jones et al., 
2013), were not elicited by the paranoia prototype.  
 
In summary, Study 1b has provided evidence that the concept of paranoia has a 
prototype structure, such that some features were regarded as more characteristic of 
the concept than others. Moreover, participants found this to be a meaningful task, 
fulfilling the first criterion for demonstrating that a concept is prototypically 
organised. Both the tasks, of open-ended generation and centrality ratings, seem to 
present a view of paranoia that in many ways mirrors that of psychiatric opinion and 
theoretical conceptions; multidimensional, anxiety-based, consisting of cognitive 
elements and being somewhat problematic in nature. Where the lay definition differed 
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was in its acknowledgement of relevant interpersonal factors, as well as capturing 
nuances involved particularly within the affective and behavioural processes that 
surround feelings of paranoia. In contrast to current theoretical conceptions (e.g. Ellett 
et al., 2003), the paranoia prototype does not feature evolutionary perspectives of 
paranoia. Overall, the paranoia prototype has been able to capture not only peoples’ 
conceptualisations of paranoia but also a sense of paranoia’s heterogeneity and 
broadness in ways that previous categorical definitions have struggled to do.  
Study 2 – Validating the prototype. 
If lay conceptions of paranoia are prototypically organised, then its structure should 
affect cognition. More specifically, it was hypothesised that the prototype should 
affect performance on both recognition and recall memory tasks (Hepper et al., 2011; 
Kearns & Fincham, 2004). Activation of a prototype causes features closely 
associated with the prototype to be more easily accessible in memory (Cantor & 
Mischel, 1979). The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate both recall and recognition 
memory in a single experiment. It was proposed that it would be difficult for 
participants to distinguish between central features of paranoia that were presented 
during an acquisition phase and other central features of paranoia that were not 
presented, but were closely associated with the concept. Peripheral features, however, 
should be much easier to distinguish because they are less closely associated with 
paranoia (Hepper et al., 2011). Therefore, because central features should be more 
salient in memory than peripheral features, it was expected that participants would 
correctly recall and recognise more central features of paranoia. Additionally, it was 
predicted that participants would be more likely to falsely recognise central than 
peripheral features. The findings of Study 2 will now be explored in greater detail.      
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It was observed that participants were unable to recall many of the paranoia features, 
either central or peripheral. Participants correctly recalled less than 30% of the 
features that they had seen, both central and peripheral. Despite this being a low 
percentage, this is consistent with results found in other prototype analyses (Kearns & 
Fincham, 2004). Of the items recalled, participants rarely included ones that were not 
presented, resulting in less than 4.4 features on average being generated. This low rate 
of recall could be explained by literature that proposes that recall of items is harder 
than recognition (Kintsch, 1970). Indeed, a higher rate of recognition was found 
within Study 2.  Recognition requires a lower threshold of strength than does recall. 
During recall an item is first retrieved from memory by the search process; it is then 
tested by the recognition process, which determines if it is from the ‘to-be-recalled’ 
list. Therefore, for an item to be recalled, it must be both successfully retrieved and 
recognised (Kintsch, 1970).  
 
Results from this study provide evidence that fulfils the second criterion for 
demonstrating that paranoia is prototypically organised; that centrality of the paranoia 
features affect cognition. Participants both correctly recalled and falsely recognised 
more central features of paranoia. It appears that when participants were presented 
with the paranoia features, the concept itself was activated. The concept then acted as 
an organising principle for processing further material, resulting in a bias toward 
recognising non-presented, but highly related, features of the concept. However, 
contrary to our predictions, it was found that feature centrality did not affect correct 
recognition. The number of central features recognised was not significantly different 
from peripheral features. There are inconsistencies within previous prototype 
 96 
literature as to what has been found regarding correct recognition (Hepper et al., 
2011; Seuntjens et al., 2015), meaning it is difficult to explain this result based on 
current theory. 
One possible explanation for the non-significant finding is that recognition of features 
may differ in a number of ways that are unrelated to prototypicality but which may 
influence recall and recognition. For example, the positive or negative valence of 
features. However, the current study recorded only the number of features listed in the 
recall and recognition tasks, not the features themselves. There is therefore no way of 
determining whether particular features were recalled or recognised more than others. 
For example, it could be hypothesised that words with potential to shock (e.g. evil or 
mad) might be processed differently in memory. This phenomenon may have 
impacted upon results and led to more of these types of peripheral features being 
recognised. Future research could consider these potential distinctions between 
features. However, prototype methodology for emotion concepts does not routinely 
report this (Gregg et al., 2008; Hepper et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2014; Seuntjens et 
al., 2015) and has received some criticism for being over simplistic and ignoring the 
more subtle issues surrounding information processing (Clore & Ortony, 1988; 
Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). More systematic examination into the impact of 
feature valence and other factors that may influence recognition and recall, would 
improve the reliability and validity of such methodologies.  
 
In summary, the paranoia prototype affected performance on both recall and false 
recognition memory tasks, suggestive of lay conceptions of paranoia affecting 
cognition and thus being prototypically organised. These initial findings would 
benefit from replication to attest to their reliability and validity. Future research may 
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look to complete the additional stages involved in fully validating a new prototype. 
This process should involve using the exemplar categories as stimulus material for the 
induction of paranoia to examine whether central (more than peripheral) exemplars 
lead to the description of an experience as paranoia (Fehr, Russell, & Ward, 1982; 
Hassebrauck, 1997; Hepper et al., 2011; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Kintsch, 1980); 
whether central (more than peripheral) exemplars are likely to induce paranoia; and to 
examine whether central exemplars induce paranoia at least as effectively as existing 
manipulations (e.g. Ellett & Chadwick, 2007). Such investigation would improve 
upon the ability to make more conclusive statements about the construct of lay 
conceptions of paranoia. 
4.3 Strengths and Limitations of study  
It is important that the findings are considered within the context of strengths and 
limitations of the study’s methodology. These will be outlined next. 
 
Sampling Methods  
 
First, it is important to consider the strengths and limitations of the sample recruited 
for the service user involvement aspects of the thesis. This project used a student user 
group sample, largely made up of psychology students. These students would be more 
in tune with what would motivate psychology students to sign up for the studies rather 
than students from other departments. It would have been useful to include students 
from a range of other departments and members of the general population within the 
service user group to support recruitment of the general population.   
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Second, the number of participants recruited to the current study exceeded the 
suggested number recommended by the a priori power calculation for all three 
hypotheses. This is indicative of a sufficiently powered sample enabling the detection 
of any effects that were present and the reduction in the likelihood of a Type II error 
occurring. With regards to Hypothesis 2, which found a non-significant result, one 
possible explanation may have been that this specific test was underpowered so 
unable to detect a difference. However, previous research found effects of f = .5 
(Seuntjens et al., 2015) and Study 2 had good power (a good chance of achieving a 
statistically significant result) with N = 125, so the fact an effect was not found is 
meaningful. From a theoretical perspective it makes sense that a significant difference 
would be observed between central and peripheral features on correct recognition. 
However, it is possible this finding indicates something specific about the nature of 
the construct of paranoia, but as mentioned there are inconsistencies within the 
prototype literature as to what has been found with regards to correct recognition. It is 
therefore hard to explain this pattern of results based on current theory.  
 
Third, the thesis used under optimal convenience sampling (Barker et al., 2003) for all 
three parts of the project, but benefitted from the cost and accessibility advantages 
that this sampling strategy provided. The sample was also self-selected. Research 
using opt in strategies have been found to include higher proportions of individuals 
with some level of psychological difficulty (Freeman, Garety, Bebbington, Smith et 
al., 2005). That said, the present study was advertised with no reference to 
psychological theory, and was instead advertised as ‘Individual Attitudes and 
Differences’ to reduce this effect. Despite thinking carefully about how the study was 
advertised, the wording of adverts and brief descriptions still may have had some 
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impact on who decided to partake, thereby impacting upon the conceptions of 
paranoia obtained. Additionally, so as not to be constrained by a purely student 
sample, other methods were employed to recruit participants, including the use of 
Facebook and other social media sites. It is possible that these methods, which could 
have included acquaintances or family members connected to the researchers, may 
mean that the sample was not truly representative of the general population. 
  
Sample 
 
As mentioned, this group of studies focused on the content of general paranoia as 
described by a large proportion of psychology undergraduates (approximately 70% of 
the total sample). Psychology students might be expected to be more likely than other 
members of the general population to view paranoia from a clinical perspective. This 
may have the effect of reducing generalisability of the current study to other samples 
and means the paranoia prototype may not be truly representative of lay views. Future 
research should include a larger broad sweeping sample of the general population to 
enhance the reliability and validity of the paranoia prototype.  
 
The majority of participants in this thesis also classed themselves as Caucasian (83%), 
with only small percentages of other ethnicities being represented, again reducing the 
generalisability of the findings to other samples. The small samples from other ethnic 
groups also meant that cultural differences within the current sample could not be 
explored. This is particularly pertinent as there are uncertainties around whether 
emotion concepts are culturally specific or have pan-cultural components (Russell, 
1991). Furthermore, when considering current literature, it is possible that cultural 
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differences do exist within conceptions of paranoia. Increased prevalence of paranoia 
in ethnic minority groups has been found at the more extreme end of the nonclinical 
continuum (Freeman et al., 2011). More specifically, many of the environmental 
conditions that ethnic minorities face, such as low socioeconomic status (SES), 
poverty, discrimination, social isolation, and the stresses of immigration, have all 
been related to cultural mistrust and suspiciousness (i.e. subclinical paranoia, 
Fenigstein, 1998). Within clinical populations, ethnicity has been identified as a 
crucial moderator variable for differences in the expression of psychopathology 
(Carter, Miller, Sbrocco, Suchday & Lewis, 1999). Despite clinical paranoia being 
observed around the world, there is evidence to suggest that it does not manifest itself 
in the same way across cultures, as categorical classification systems would suggest. 
Different cultures display different symptoms and manifestations of paranoia, often 
due to cultural norms and the socio-centricity of a culture (Bauer et al., 2011), as well 
as there being varying influences on diagnosis and treatment (Banerjee, 2012). 
However, as cultural differences within the current sample were not explored, it is not 
known whether differences captured within clinical populations exist within lay views 
of paranoia. As with other prototype analyses that have explicitly compared 
differences between ethnic groups within samples (Kearns & Fincham, 2004) and 
cross-culturally (Morgan et al., 2014), future research could uncover cultural 
differences within lay conceptions of paranoia. This could facilitate an increased 
understanding and awareness of culture, its impact on lay conceptions and how it 
affects psychopathologies at the extreme end of the continuum.   
 
As well as ethnicity, the study did not include analyses of any other individual 
difference factors that may have been present within the prototype. As discussed in 
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the introduction the role of levels of anxiety has been demonstrated to be central to 
the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2013; 
Freeman, Brugha, et al., 2010; Freeman, Pugh et al., 2008). Additionally, other 
individual differences such as age, gender and religious background have been shown 
to be differentially associated with both clinical (de Portugal et al., 2010) and 
nonclinical (Hirschfield et al., 2005; Mata, Mataix-Cols, Peralta, 2005) paranoia. 
However, because these differences were not included in the study design, the present 
project cannot provide comment on the potential individual differences that may or 
may not exist within lay conceptions of paranoia or whether such differences parallel 
those observed within nonclinical or clinical paranoia literature. It would therefore be 
highly recommended that the next steps to develop research in this area consider 
individual difference factors within the prototype of paranoia, as the prototype may 
change as a function of such differences. This is particularly important due to the fact 
that not everybody views paranoia in the same way.  
 
Measures  
 
Another limitation of the thesis was that current or past experience of psychosis was 
not considered as part of the participant exclusion criteria and no screening measure 
was employed to ensure that this research sampled a truly nonclinical population. A 
more stringent methodology could have been applied such as using the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II disorders (SCID-II; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, 
Williams, 1997) administered by trained personnel, although resources to be able to 
do this were limited in the present study. Obtaining this information may have 
allowed us to consider results along the paranoia continuum and comment on possible 
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differences within conceptualisations across the population depending on people’s 
personal experience of paranoia. This is another area for future research to consider 
examining.  
 
Methodology 
 
Using prototype methodology to define a concept also presents its own strengths and 
limitations. As with other natural language concepts (Rosch, 1978), it seemed as 
though the construct of paranoia lent itself well to being conceptualised as an 
indistinct category. Prototype methodologies provide both structural flexibility and 
inclusiveness to a concept. This was particularly relevant given that researchers and 
clinicians had recognised degrees of paranoia and apparent heterogeneity of the 
concept. Indeed, within this study, prototype methodologies have gone some way 
towards enabling paranoia’s inherent complexity to be captured, thereby improving 
the coverage of the definition. However, general criticisms of the prototype approach, 
also apply to this study. For example, the prototype of paranoia could be criticised for 
lacking clarity and detail about the precise definition of the ‘prototype’ itself. More 
specifically, it could be criticised for adopting an idiosyncratic range of critical 
features (Armstrong et al., 1983), as although certain features appear to be more 
central than others, it is difficult to establish which ones truly take priority when 
considering category membership. The study acknowledges that the process around 
categorisation of concepts is a complex one, however this remains to be a point of 
contention within concept literature. 
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This project was based on Hepper et al.’s (2011) methodology, however a general 
criticism of prototype theory is that there are a range of methodologies and analyses 
employed across the literature. For example, a range of methodological techniques 
have been used to illustrate the internal structure of different constructs, such as 
examining reaction time (Fehr & Rusell, 1991; Gregg et al., 2008), recall memory 
(Fehr, 1988; Kearns & Fincham, 2004), recognition memory (Fehr, 1988; Kearns & 
Fincham, 2004; Lambert et al., 2009) and lexical decision tasks (Fehr & Russell, 
1991). The greater the convergence of measures of internal structure, the greater the 
confidence with which one can argue that a concept is prototypically organised. It is 
possible that employing alternative methods other than ones used by Hepper et al. 
(2011) may have resulted in different central features for the construct of paranoia 
emerging. However, there are not currently criteria for determining which methods 
are most suitable. It could be that different methods are more appropriate for different 
constructs, but at present this has not been examined so remains unclear. There is 
need for further investigation to review and reach some level of agreement around the 
preeminent approaches to developing and validating prototypes, for a gold standard to 
be found. In spite of these potential methodological limitations, the prototype of 
paranoia is a first step in better understanding the structure of the psychological 
construct.  
 
As previously mentioned, this project only garnered a subjective sense of whether 
features of paranoia were positive or negative. Previous prototype research has 
examined this using varying methodological approaches. For example some studies 
have prompted participants to ‘remember that features listed can be positive or 
negative’ (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Neto & Mullet, 2014) and 
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then elicited a rating on a Likert scale from extremely negative to extremely positive. 
Other studies have explicitly asked participants to list both positive and negative 
characteristics that come to mind, forcing participants to consider the concept from 
both perspectives (Seuntjens et al., 2015). This could also be achieved by probing 
participants about potential causes and consequences of paranoia. If future 
investigations were to implement such methodologies, researchers would then have a 
more accurate understanding of whether lay conceptions include positive views of 
paranoia or not. This would allow for more in depth comparisons to be made with the 
current literature.  
 
A key methodological challenge of this research is unpicking whether the question 
asked in Study 1a (i.e. asking participants to list features and characteristics that, in 
their opinion, best described and distinguished paranoia) accurately elicited the 
concept in question. The information sheet did not cue participants into their 
experiences of paranoia and the term paranoia within the instructions could have been 
interpreted in a number of different ways. For example, with the majority of 
participants being psychology students they might have naturally conceptualised 
paranoia from a clinical perspective. The investigation was therefore into paranoia 
broadly rather than lay paranoia per se. Such issues could contribute to explaining 
why adaptive or societal aspects of lay paranoia were not accessed and provide reason 
as to why a clinical, more intrapersonal view was obtained. However, if explicitly 
probed about their understandings of paranoia as used in everyday language, 
participants might have listed different or additional features. Given the well accepted 
dimensional view (Chapman & Chapman, 1980, Claridge, 1997; Johns, 2005; Peters, 
Joseph, & Garety, 1999; Roesler et al., 2007; Rossler et al., 2011; Van Os & Verdoux, 
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2003) it is conceivable that different perspectives of paranoia may not have clear 
distinctions, however this cannot be assumed and this was not clear given the results 
found within this project. Future research could embed the term ‘paranoia’ within a 
contextualised sentence to ensure that what was being elicited was the cultural lexicon 
of the now widely used word ‘paranoia’. Instructions could describe an example 
situation and then explore the participants’ understanding of this. For example, ‘When 
someone says to you “why are you being paranoid?” or “don’t be paranoid”, what 
do you understand that person to mean?’. In addition to this researchers could get 
people to list their own experiences of paranoia. These alternative approaches would 
ensure that particular conceptions of paranoia were explicitly probed. This would 
enable researchers to draw out differences between perspectives, if true differences 
exist. 
 
These adaptations to the methodology would additionally allow for consideration of 
context within lay conceptions of paranoia. Prototype theory anchors the ideational 
content of the concept, without excluding variants, and does not deem difference as 
deviant (Fox, 2011). This means that prototypical definitions rely heavily on context 
and are significantly subject to social flux. The fact prototypes are contextually 
variant can be seen as both a strength and a limitation of prototype methodology. 
These issues mean prototypes may be particularly sensitive to methodological 
approaches, such as how questions are framed to elicit prototypic features. It is very 
plausible that the lay paranoia prototype may differ across different contexts. More 
specifically, people may conceptualise paranoia differently in the context of different 
types of relationships. For example, paranoia within a romantic relationship may be 
very different from paranoia within a social situation with friends. This highlights the 
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importance of establishing the context in which the term is used, (e.g. embedding it 
within a contextualised sentence) as this may impact on the results obtained. Once 
researchers are confident that they have obtained the cultural lexicon of lay paranoia 
used within everyday conversation, future research would then be able to examine the 
stability of the paranoia prototype across different situations to examine prototypical 
paranoia types.  
 
Given the challenges presented around accurately obtaining the construct of lay 
paranoia, it is possible that eliciting the true meaning behind lay conceptions of 
paranoia is not best suited to prototype methodology. Paranoia differs from other 
emotion concept prototypes established in that it has backgrounds in both clinical and 
societal domains. This may add complexity and make it less suitable to being 
captured within one prototype. Qualitative interview approaches may be more suitable 
for generating information about a construct, as has been done with service users’ 
experiences of clinical paranoia (Boyd & Gumley, 2007; Carrick et al., 
2004; Hirschfield et al., 2005; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2013; McNally & Goldberg, 
1997). Research into the area of lay paranoia is novel and future investigation should 
consider implementing qualitative techniques and the possible benefits that these 
approaches may provide.   
 
Despite this study’s contribution to systematically examining laypersons’ 
understandings of paranoia, as mentioned, the project only completed the initial steps 
involved in the validation process. Further validation of the prototype was beyond the 
scope of this study. This means conclusions that the study can draw around the 
validity of the paranoia prototype are limited. As discussed, it will be important that 
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future research completes the additional steps specified for validation by previous 
prototype analyses (Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Hepper et al., 2011; Kearns & Fincham, 
2004; Lambert et al., 2009). Additionally, the results from the current thesis do not 
inform us as to whether features of paranoia are interrelated. Future research could 
explore the dimensions underlying participants’ descriptions of paranoia by 
employing similarity ratings, as done in previous prototype analyses (Xu et al., 2008). 
The completion of these steps is fundamental for the paranoia prototype to gain 
further legitimacy. Once more thoroughly validated the potential utility that the 
prototype may have in therapeutic settings can be more systematically explored. 
4.4 Theoretical and Clinical Implications  
Although the current study treats lay conceptions of paranoia as a topic of interest in 
its own right, it is important to consider some tentative theoretical and clinical 
implications of the findings. 
Theoretical implications.  
 
How can a prototype analysis of lay conceptions of paranoia inform paranoia 
research?  
 
This is the first study to systematically examine laypersons’ understandings of 
paranoia. As such, it plays an important role in allowing us to begin to determine 
whether laypersons’ conceptualisations of paranoia correspond to existing theoretical 
and scientific approaches to the construct. Researchers have offered a number of 
definitions in an attempt to outline what is and what is not to be included under the 
term paranoia. Despite developments in the understanding of paranoia, there is also 
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recognition of remaining methodological flaws and pitfalls (Freeman, 2007). In 
particular, the tendency for research to ignore the multi-dimensional nature of 
paranoia or define the phenomena in detail has been highlighted. Although the current 
findings indicate that there is much overlap between lay conceptions of paranoia and 
theoretical accounts, they also indicate that there are differences. These differences 
include the paranoia prototype implying mental illness and not featuring evolutionary 
or functional perspectives of paranoia. This raises the issue of what the relationship 
should be between lay conceptions and scientific definitions. Stated differently, how 
can lay conceptions of paranoia contribute to theory and research about paranoia?  
 
As highlighted in previous prototype analyses, there are a number of potential 
answers to this question (Fehr & Russell, 1991). At one extreme is the position that 
lay conceptions of paranoia are irrelevant to science and therefore should be ignored. 
This view postulates that discrepancies between theoretical and lay conceptions are 
deemed irrelevant to science. At the other extreme is the position that lay conceptions 
of paranoia are essential to the experience of paranoia, thus the scientific study of 
paranoia is the study of the concept of paranoia. From this standpoint, inconsistencies 
between scientific and lay conceptions demonstrate flaws in theoretical accounts. 
Finally, there is a middle position between the two extremes, which is that scientific 
analysis depends on everyday concepts, which can organise and improve these 
constructs (Fehr & Russell, 1991). In this section, attempts will be made to integrate 
these positions, as none of these positions in isolation is adequate.  
 
Addressing definitional issues.  
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First, the present findings can inform definitional issues. Researchers who study 
everyday social phenomena, of which paranoia is one example, need to define them 
conceptually (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), which is a challenge because definitions 
must reconcile the tension between two vital criteria - rigour and coverage. Empirical 
research on this important social phenomenon was yet to examine how individuals in 
the general population define and conceptualise paranoia, which was needed to reflect 
the construct’s broad societal and cultural significance. The paranoia prototype means 
we are now able to describe lay views of paranoia in a way that balances the demands 
of scientific validation and comprehensive coverage. That is, we have identified and 
begun to validate a set of operationalisable prototypical features, while reflecting the 
richness and diversity of laypersons’ conceptualisations. Existing medical diagnostic 
criteria (e.g. DSM-V; APA, 2013) and current theoretical definitions (e.g. Freeman & 
Garety, 2000) focus on defining persecutory delusions and could be criticised for 
overly prioritising rigour over coverage. They reference a perceived sense of threat or 
harm, the sense of distress that may accompany such beliefs and the conviction within 
which paranoid beliefs are held. However, those definitions omit other prototypical 
features and assume a standardised and classically defined paranoia experience. The 
prototype of paranoia is complex and provides no sharp boundary between paranoia 
and other, related experiences. The present empirical approach suggests that a clear-
cut classical definition does not adequately capture the structure of paranoia seen 
from the perspective of lay people, and calls instead for a description that reflects the 
prototype better.  
 
In addition to improving the definitional coverage, the finding that paranoia is 
prototypically organised fits with a dimensional theoretical view of paranoia (e.g. 
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Costello, 1994; Mason & Claridge, 2006; Roessler et al., 2007; Rossler et al., 2011). 
The prototype structure provides representation of paranoia that is able to support the 
continuum hypothesis and represent aspects of paranoia’s multidimensionality, where 
classical conceptions have struggled. Rather than focusing on single aspects, the 
prototype is generative and provides a set of related but distinguishable terms that can 
punctuate meaningful points along the continuum. 
 
The fact that mental illness and delusions were central features of the prototype 
suggests that participants naturally conceptualise paranoia from a clinical standpoint. 
This finding is also suggestive that people conceptualise everyday experiences as 
different from paranoia. Despite this outcome being counterintuitive to a continuous 
relationship (Mason & Claridge, 2006), caution must be taken due to the nature of the 
sample population. Additionally, other features of the prototype were more indicative 
of a dimensional view and mirrored findings within the continuum literature. For 
example, central features, such as social isolation, demonstrated commonality 
between risk factors for both nonclinical and clinical paranoia found within empirical 
literature (Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os 2003). Anxiety and thinking error 
features also reflected cognitive affective variables implicated in the formation and 
maintenance of paranoia along the continuum (Allen, Freeman, Johns & Maguire, 
2006; Bebbington et al., 2013; Freeman et al., 2011). If the cultural lexicon of lay 
paranoia was specifically elicited, future research could serve to elucidate the 
crossover between the current paranoia prototype and a lay paranoia prototype. 
Comparisons between overlapping constructs have been examined within previous 
prototype analyses (e.g. love and commitment) (Fehr, 1988). Such developments have 
the potential to further our understanding of how lay conceptions fit with existing 
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theoretical continuum views, and inform possible distinctions within the dimensional 
view itself (Costello, 1994). 
 
More broadly speaking, it is also pertinent to consider the literatures approach as a 
whole to theorising paranoia and the possible implications of such standpoints. It 
could be argued that the way paranoia has been conceptualised to enable considering 
it as part of general experience means that some qualities of the construct are lost 
along the way. For example, when considering Freeman and Garety’s (2000) criteria 
for defining persecutory delusions (one of the most widely accepted definitions), 
some may postulate that in their efforts to accommodate a view of paranoia as a 
common psychological process, the delusional aspects of paranoia have been lost. 
That is, they do not include anything about the belief being unfounded.  This has 
implications for research that has used the definition and measures of paranoia. It will 
be important for literature to consider the wider implications involved in 
conceptualising paranoia as on a continuum and to review the possible definitional 
pitfalls of trying to capture the breadth of the whole construct in different ways.        
 
Implications for the assessment, manipulation and measurement of paranoia.  
 
First, many existing studies into nonclinical paranoia present with methodological 
drawbacks (Freeman et al., 2008). The challenge has been that there are discrepancies 
between accounts of paranoia itself (Freeman & Garety, 2004) and literature has had a 
tendency to ignore the multi-dimensional nature of the experience of paranoia 
(Freeman, 2007), often making it unclear what exactly is being measured. An 
informal classification system can be traced within the paranoia literature, in which 
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terms such as paranoid or paranoid-like cognitions/thoughts/ideation/suspicions are 
often used to refer to non-clinical experiences. However, these terms have not been 
defined and there is no consensus as to how they relate to, and are distinguishable 
from, one another (Freeman, 2007). Not only are there inconsistencies in the terms 
used, there will also be inherent differences in how terminology is interpreted by 
different individuals. As has been demonstrated, paranoia means different things to 
different people. The prototype is informative, as it has given us insight into the 
interpretations people might make when the term paranoia is used within research, 
which are perhaps different from those intended. Research is yet to understand how 
people interpret other terms frequently used to describe paranoia within nonclinical 
literature. Future investigation into this area would further inform the measurement of 
paranoia and related constructs.     
 
Second, when considering the measurement of paranoia, recent literature has 
highlighted a need for measures to be specific to current definitions and for such tools 
to be informed by lay perspectives. There are currently a number of measures 
available that have attempted the former and moved away from widely used one-
dimensional models (e.g. Fenigstein & Vanable’s Paranoia Scale (PS; 1992)). The 
Green et al Paranoid Thought Scales (GPTS; Green et al., 2008) and the General 
Paranoia Scale (GPS; Barreto Carvalho et al., 2015), for example, both have 
endeavoured to make measures which are specific to Freeman and Garety’s (2000) 
definition of paranoid thoughts, in terms of being dimensional in content (i.e. consider 
a hierarchy or paranoid thoughts), and severity (assesses preoccupation, conviction 
and distress) and valid and reliable for both clinical and nonclinical populations. The 
paranoia prototype supports this move to measuring a construct that is multi-
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dimensional in nature. Despite improvements in measuring paranoia multi-
dimensionally, further refinement and enrichment of this process in different 
populations is necessary. For example, measures have been developed that are 
informed by service-user perspectives within clinical populations, such as the 
Subjective Experiences of Psychosis Scale (SEPS; Haddock, et al., 2011). However 
there is also a need to develop scales that have taken account views of people within 
the general population. The prototype has the potential to inform development of such 
a measure and to improve the accessibility of measures by incorporating features of 
the prototype within the wording of questionnaires. This would further inform the 
assessment of dimensions of paranoia and the potential risk of clinical paranoia in a 
measure for the general population. 
 
Prior studies have relied on the term paranoia both to measure and to induce the 
experience. Therefore, results depended on participants having a clear and consensual 
understanding of the word, and, possibly were vulnerable to demand characteristics. 
This study has laid the foundations for future research to provide participants with a 
collection of layperson accessible features of paranoia instead of using the word 
paranoia. This has the potential to reduce demand characteristics and support the 
study of paranoia in different populations (e.g. different languages, children). For 
example, a manipulation or measure using the set of prototypical features would be 
more accessible for those less familiar with the subtle meaning of the word paranoia. 
Future research would need to consider whether comparable results are obtained 
regardless of whether participants are given the word paranoia or a set of central 
features. Furthermore, it may be difficult to directly translate the term paranoia into 
other languages; the paranoia prototype features could enable investigation of the 
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prototype of paranoia across cultures, and could be instrumental for studying the 
functions of lay conceptions of paranoia in cross-cultural contexts in the future. 
Although paranoia was seen as largely negative within this study, this does not mean 
that it is necessarily conceptualised in the same way across different cultures.  
Prototype analyses may be used to highlight differences in the way in which a concept 
is understood cross-culturally or in different populations (Fehr, 1988).  
 
Supplementing existing definitions and theoretical conceptions. 
 
The prototype of paranoia complements current literature that proposes that no single 
criteria signals paranoia (Freeman, 2007), but that the experience of paranoia is a 
complex and dynamic experience that demonstrates huge individual variability. The 
prototype provides further credibility to the view that there exists a multiplicity of 
valid explanations for such experiences, which encompass not only the medical but, 
also a variety of other standpoints. Lay understandings uncovered using the prototype 
theory provide structural flexibility and inclusiveness and a prototype that is able to 
complement existing definitions. As Armstrong et al. (1983) propose there is perhaps 
not one ‘general theory’ of categorisation that subsumes all different domains of a 
concept, but rather prototypes such as this one that help inform theoretical and 
psychiatric systems already proposed; for example, offering support for current 
theoretical definitions that have moved away from needing to determine a set of 
criteria with which to judge falsity (Coltheart, 2007). Clore and Ortony (1988) further 
this argument by stating that the goal of prototype theory is not to define the emotion, 
but to discover the structure of the psychological condition to which such words 
apply. Therefore, what is being uncovered within prototype approaches are not 
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necessarily new concepts of emotions, but explications of what is assumed to be 
inherent in the existing meanings of emotion terms (Clore & Ortony, 1988). 
Additionally, this project acts a reminder that a concept might contain multiple 
prototypes (Fox, 2011). Future research could look to validate a prototype of paranoia 
that is complementary rather than a competitor of other theoretical conceptions, with 
neither being paramount. As a result a greater understanding could be established 
around how these different definitions fit together and inform one another.  
 
Summary of theoretical implications.  
 
Uncovering a paranoia prototype has helped lay the groundwork towards developing a 
better empirical and theoretical understanding of a term prevalent in people’s 
everyday life. Improving the coverage, clarity and coherence around the definition 
from a lay perspective has the potential to have positive methodological implications 
for the measurement of paranoia, namely by enabling future research to manipulate 
and measure paranoia using prototypic features. It also instigates the initial steps in 
providing a lay definition that has the potential to supplement existing definitions. 
Additionally, the shift to viewing paranoia on a continuum (Roessler et al., 2007; 
Rossler et al., 2011) has meant that researchers have been searching for a universal 
definition that is able to accommodate such variance and multidimensionality, as well 
as experiential perspectives across the continuum. It is unlikely that one definition 
alone will subsume all of these aspects. However, the prototype of paranoia offers 
important acknowledgement of different perspectives and has the potential to 
supplement existing definitions in ways that current conceptualisations do not.  
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Clinical Implications.  
 
Above other strengths, this study acts as promoting lay views, highlighting the 
importance and utility of acknowledging different perspectives other than dominant 
psychiatric and theoretical narratives. It is now clear that paranoia has an everyday 
layman’s meaning as well as the established theoretical (Freeman & Garety, 2000) 
and psychiatric categorisations (DSM-V, APA, 2013). This thesis indicates that these 
definitions overlap extensively, but that there are aspects of lay conceptualisations 
that are not emphasised in existing categories and vice versa. The theoretical and 
psychiatric definitions available are limited. The prototype uncovered reminds us that 
the various terms usually employed to describe paranoia (or features of paranoia) are 
themselves complex. Within themselves each feature may also fluctuate in severity 
across time within an individual (Ellett et al., 2003). Each of these facets can exist on 
various levels of severity. In a given individual it is important to treat features as 
distinguishable dimensions and recognise that some individuals will fit this paranoia 
prototype more closely than others. With this in mind, possible clinical implications 
of this thesis will now be discussed.  
 
Psycho-education and therapeutic intervention.  
 
In contrast to categorical views of paranoia that purport the experience as being 
qualitatively different from normal experiences, the ultimate aim of the integration of 
nonclinical paranoia research and treatment programmes for paranoia is that the word 
‘paranoia’ would not imply mental illness, but would rather describe an ordinary 
psychological process characterised by a perception of planned intention to harm by 
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others (Ellett & Chadwick, 2007). The paranoia prototype is both supportive and 
challenging to the notion that laypeople are conceptualising paranoia in this way. The 
fact that lay conceptions appear to have a prototypic structure is supportive of a more 
dimensional view of paranoia, however the prototype developed also seems to view 
paranoia as implying mental illness, at least for some. The psychiatric view still 
permeates lay perspectives. In future, the paranoia prototype could support the 
normalising agenda (Freeman & Freeman, 2008), by using a range of central features 
to talk about paranoia, normalise the experience and enhance education. More 
specifically, features of the paranoia prototype could inform psychoeducational tools 
and self-help books (e.g. Freeman, Garety, & Freeman, 2012). Such resources aimed 
at individuals with nonclinical (and clinical) paranoia could include prototypic 
features to ensure language is representative of the lay view.  
 
As well as implying mental illness, the paranoia prototype also demonstrates that 
people do not naturally think of positive adaptive aspects of paranoia. Despite much 
theoretical and empirical evidence for the evolutionary perspective, it appears these 
views are not spontaneously elicited within lay populations. It may be necessary for 
clinicians to acknowledge the fact that lay conceptions just do not feature adaptive of 
nonclinical aspects of paranoia particularly as many treatment approaches to 
psychosis include a normalising component aimed at educating the individual about 
dimensional views (Johns & van Os, 2001). This includes reducing self-stigma 
through imparting an appreciation of the symptoms of psychosis being present in 
those without a mental illness diagnosis, as well as laying them open to rational 
argument thereby bringing them into the realm of normal human experience. A 
normalising approach is now common in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT; 
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Kingdon & Turkington, 1994) and modified CBT for Psychosis (CBT-P; Fowler, 
Garety, & Kuipers, 1995; Sensky et al., 2000) and has been shown in empirical trials 
to help individuals with psychosis (e.g., Kingdon & Turkington, 1991; Kingdon & 
Turkington, 1994; Sensky et al., 2000). The normalising approach within treatment is 
particularly important given that research evidence from numerous quantitative and 
qualitative studies have shown that stigma towards individuals with psychosis is 
commonplace in members of the general population (Penn & Martin, 1998), and even 
within mental health professionals themselves (e.g. Faugier & Sargeant, 1997; Rao et 
al., 2009). However, clinicians’ attempts to implement a normalising approach could 
feel incongruent to individuals particularly if lay conceptions just do not feature 
positive or adaptive aspects of paranoia. Indeed, findings from the prototype analysis 
of paranoia were both encouraging and discouraging with regards to the normalising, 
anti-stigma movement. Evidence of stigmatising views were highlighted within this 
research, as pejorative features (e.g. weird/mad, evil) were shown to be included 
within the prototype. Although these features were fairly frequently cited, they were 
rated as peripheral to people’s understanding of paranoia. This is encouraging for 
anti-stigma campaigns as prototype theory would suggest that peripheral features are 
less salient in people’s mind and less frequently recalled or recognised as being 
associated with paranoia. However, it is possible that if the study were to be repeated 
solely within the general population such features may be rated as more central to 
people’s conceptualisations of paranoia.   
 
Additionally, the presence of negative and pejorative features within the prototype 
could also be representative of some resistance to the anti-stigma campaign. Such 
findings could provide evidence that sensationalised media coverage about issues like 
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schizophrenia, actually reinforce negative connotations of paranoia and maintain 
depreciatory views within society, over and above anti-stigma campaign material. As 
mentioned, it is possible that other factors influence recall and recognition of different 
types of material, which may override normal processing of prototypes; for example, 
feature valence or the frequency with which people are exposed to different types of 
information. It was beyond the scope of this project to examine these issues. However 
if such factors do play a part, media coverage surrounding schizophrenia including 
words such as ‘evil’ or ‘mad’, are powerful messages that it would be hard for anti-
stigma campaigns to compete with. One possible application of the prototype to target 
this issue could be to tailor literature within campaigns to ensure language used is not 
too far removed from the clinical view (central features) to prevent people from 
relating to it. This would facilitate anti-stigma messages to be more readily encoded 
and thus more accessible in memory. This may have the added benefit of supporting a 
shift in people’s views towards central features of paranoia and away from more 
stigmatising peripheral features that appeared within the prototype.  
 
In summary, it is hoped that findings from the current research can contribute to a 
drive for less stigmatising views towards those who do experience persecutory 
delusions, in line with movements in mental health provision toward Recovery 
models for severe mental health (e.g. Anthony, 1993; Repper & Perkins, 2003) and 
wider psychological provision that focuses on social inclusion (e.g. BPS, 2008). 
4.5 Conclusions  
The primary purpose of the current project was to examine lay conceptions of 
paranoia in order to develop and validate a prototype of the construct and thereby 
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understand how individuals themselves define and conceptualise paranoia. Whilst 
acknowledging the limitations outlined, several conclusions can be drawn from the 
current study that include novel contributions to the literature. The results of this 
series of studies provide initial support for the idea that people have and use a 
prototype for paranoia. We found that lay views of paranoia have an internal structure 
that meets the two criteria for prototypic organisation. More specifically, participants 
made meaningful and reliable decisions about the degree to which various features are 
central (important or essential) or peripheral (less important or essential) to their 
understanding of the concept of paranoia. Additionally, feature centrality affected the 
way that participants processed information about paranoia. Despite the need for 
further validation, the prototype provides an important step in promoting lay views, 
thus highlighting the importance and utility of acknowledging different perspectives 
other than dominant narratives. In addition to this, it acknowledges the similarities 
and differences between lay conceptualisations, theoretical, and professional 
perspectives. The lay paranoia prototype offers initial ideas around providing a 
framework for improvements to the definition, measurement and investigation of 
paranoia. More specifically it lays foundations for future research to investigate the 
role that the paranoia prototype could play in furthering the understanding of paranoia 
more generally, which may have important theoretical and clinical implications.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Socio-demographic information sheet  
 
Please specify your ethnicity by circling one of the options below: 
 
White/Caucasian 
 
Hispanic/Latino 
 
Black African/Caribbean  
 
Asian 
 
Multiracial 
 
Other  
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Appendix 2: Information Sheet Study 1a  
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Appendix 3: Study 1a participant instructions  
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Appendix 4: Information Sheet Study 1b 
 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham, Surrey  TW20 0EX 
www.royalholloway.ac.uk/psychology 
 
+44 (0) 1784 443526 
PSY-enquiries@rhul.ac.uk 
 
Information Sheet 
Attitudes and Individual Differences 
 
My name is Hannah Stringer and I am a research student at Royal Holloway, University of 
London. I am  carrying out a study on how we understand and define paranoia supervised 
by Dr Lyn Ellett. If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research with Dr Ellett, you 
can contact her by email Lyn.Ellett@rhul.ac.uk. If you need to contact me, please email 
Hannah.Stringer.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk or call 01784 414012. I would appreciate your 
participation, because despite the experience of paranoia being common in the general 
population, no lay definition exists. The study will help develop such a definition and aid the 
understanding of paranoia for future research.  
 
If you decide to take part, I will ask you to provide some brief information about yourself. You 
will then be presented with a list of characteristics that describe paranoia, and will be asked 
to rate how important you think each one is to your understanding of paranoia. This will take 
around 10 minutes. Nobody except my supervisor and myself will be allowed to see your 
responses and in the study you will be known only by number. So the information is 
completely confidential.  
  
You do not have to take part in this study if you don’t want to.  If you decide to take part you 
may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.  
 
Please feel free to email me to ask any questions before you complete the consent form and 
the study. This study has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology Department 
internal ethical procedure at Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Consent form                                                   ID 
number………………. 
Attitudes and Individual Differences  
 
You have been asked to participate in a study about attitudes and individual 
differences, which is being carried out by Hannah Stringer. Have you (please circle 
yes or no): 
 Read the information sheet about the study? yes no 
 Understood that you’re free to withdraw from the study 
at any time, without giving a reason?  yes no  
 
Do you agree to take part in the study? yes no 
  
Signature________________          Name in block letters ___________________ 
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Appendix 5: Information Sheet Study 2  
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham, Surrey  TW20 0EX 
www.royalholloway.ac.uk/psychology 
 
+44 (0) 1784 443526 
PSY-enquiries@rhul.ac.uk 
 
Information Sheet 
Attitudes and Individual Differences 
 
My name is Hannah Stringer and I am a research student at Royal Holloway, University of 
London. I am carrying out a study on how we understand and define paranoia supervised by 
Dr Lyn Ellett. If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research with Dr Ellett, you can 
contact her by email Lyn.Ellett@rhul.ac.uk. If you need to contact me, please email 
Hannah.Stringer.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk or call 01784 414012. I would appreciate your 
participation, because despite the experience of paranoia being common in the general 
population, no lay definition exists. The study will help develop such a definition and aid the 
understanding of paranoia for future research.  
 
If you decide to take part, I will ask you to provide some brief information about yourself. You 
will then be presented with statements about Paranoia and asked to complete a series of 
short tasks. This will take around 30 minutes and will be held in the Bowyer Building at 
Royal Holloway University. Nobody except my supervisor and myself will be allowed to see 
your responses and in the study you will be known only by number. So the information is 
completely confidential.  
  
You do not have to take part in this study if you don’t want to.  If you decide to take part you 
may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. 
 
Please feel free to ask any questions before you complete the consent form. The form will 
be stored separately from the anonymous information you provide for the research project. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology Department internal ethical 
procedure at Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………. 
Consent form                                                   ID 
number………………. 
Attitudes and Individual Differences  
 
You have been asked to participate in a study about attitudes and individual 
differences, which is being carried out by Hannah Stringer. Have you (please circle 
yes or no): 
 Read the information sheet about the study? yes no 
 Had an opportunity to ask questions? yes no 
 Got satisfactory answers to your questions? yes no 
 Understood that you’re free to withdraw from the study 
at any time, without giving a reason?  yes no  
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Do you agree to take part in the study? yes no 
  
Signature________________          Name in block letters ___________________ 
 
Date _______  
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Appendix 6: Debrief Sheet Study 1b 
 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK 
 
Debrief Sheet 
 
Attitudes and Individual Differences 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
Paranoia is an everyday social phenomenon that is common in the population at 
large.  In this study, you were asked to rate how important you thought a list of 
characteristics were to your understanding of paranoia. The reason we asked you to 
do this was because we want to establish a definition of everyday conceptions of 
paranoia. At the moment, the only definitions that exist are those provided by 
academic researchers, and we think it is important to develop a definition of paranoia 
that reflects how individuals themselves view this construct. 
 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this research with either myself, or my 
supervisor, please contact us using the details below: 
 
 
Hannah.Stringer.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
Lyn.Ellett@rhul.ac.uk or (01784 414049) 
 
If the study has raised personal issues that you are not comfortable 
discussing with the researcher now, please see the support network 
telephone number below: 
The Samaritans Telephone Number: 08457 90 90 90 
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Appendix 7: Debrief Sheet Study 2  
 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK 
 
Debrief Sheet 
 
Attitudes and Individual Differences 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
Paranoia is an everyday social phenomenon that is common in the population at 
large. In this study, you were asked to recall statements that had previously been 
classified as either central or peripheral to our understanding of paranoia. We expect 
that the most central statements about paranoia will be remembered more easily. 
The reason we asked you to do this was because we want to establish a definition of 
everyday conceptions of paranoia. At the moment, the only definitions that exist are 
those provided by academic researchers, and we think it is important to develop a 
definition of paranoia that reflects how individuals themselves view this construct. 
 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this research with either myself, or my 
supervisor, please contact us using the details below: 
 
 
Hannah.Stringer.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
Lyn.Ellett@rhul.ac.uk or (01784 414049) 
 
If the study has raised personal issues that you are not comfortable 
discussing with the researcher now, please see the support network 
telephone number below: 
 
The Samaritans Telephone Number: 08457 90 90 90 
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Appendix 8: Neutral Word Search 
 
T P B Y E R G H B S C B F R N I K J C G          
A A O N W O R B A U C I A S E N D O G N  
B P O S O F A E P N L R T D O T M W L I  
L E K D I A R Y T E D R E C G B T L H T  
E R M A C H I N E C I B K E I E A E O C  
H P A R G O T O H P A I A N N B W S L E  
B S R E T I R W E A N R A G T D O W I L  
G J K A C L O S E G I T A O K E L O D E 
G N I H C A E T R P I R O H N M L R A S  
C L O U D S Y C T O D F R O C O E B Y C 
E E L D N A H C N T B E I W T N Y R H O 
S E P A R A T E O O B H P I E S C E S M  
H H D G I D F C T M S I M N K T I P U M  
O I C R N V A T U U P R A D N R S M R A 
R X G T A I L N C R U U L O A A U U B S 
T B X H I E W L C O L E T W L T M J N C 
H O R S E W B O L E A S L E B E A O I A 
T N A L P R S O R V T I S D R O W S A R  
S Q U A R E C W E H N O T T U B A H G D  
F L O O R P U S H E T K C O L B V L A S 
 
 
  
 
AGAIN  
BADGE  
BASIC  
BEARD  
BLANKET  
BLOCK  
BOOKMARK  
BOTTLE  
BROWN  
BROWSE  
BRUSH  
BUTTON  
CAR  
CARDS 
CHAIR  
CHARACTER  
CLOSE  
CLOUDS  
COLOUR  
COMBINATION  
COMMAS  
COMPUTER  
CUP  
CURLS  
CUSHION 
DANCE  
DEMONSTRATE  
DIARY  
DOG  
DRAG  
FILE  
FLOOR  
FOOTBALL  
GREY  
HAIR  
HANDBAG  
HANDLE  
HIGHER  
HOLIDAY  
HORSE  
JUMPER  
KNOCKING  
LAMP  
LEAVES  
LETTER  
LINE  
 
MACHINE  
MUSIC  
NUMBER  
PAPER  
PHOTOGRAPH  
PLANT  
PUSH  
SCREEN  
SELECTING  
SEPARATE  
SHORT  
SOFA  
SQUARE  
STRIPES  
SWITCH  
TABLE  
TEACHING  
THROWING  
TOP  
TREE  
WINDOW  
WOOL  
WORDS  
WRITERS  
YELLOW 
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Appendix 9: Ethics Approval Form 
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